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Prayer in Public Schools After
Santa Fe Independent School District
BY MARK W. CORDES*
R eligion in public schools has long been a subject of intense
ontroversy in our country and from all appearances will remain so
for a long time to come. Among the various ways that religion might
interject itself in schools, there is none more volatile than the issue of
school prayer. Ever since the Supreme Court held in the early 1960s that
recitation of state-composed prayer in public schools was unconstitutional,'
the issue of school prayer has been a cultural flashpoint. This has included
not only various efforts by states and local school boards to finesse the
parameters of what is constitutionally permissible, but also periodic
attempts to amend the Constitution to allow school prayer.2
"Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.S. 1975,
Portland StateUniversity; J.D. 1980, WillametteUniversity; J.S.M. 1983, Stanford
University. The author would like to thank Peter Ames for his research assistance
in the preparation of this Article.
'See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2 Constitutional amendments for school prayer have frequently been proposed
over the years. A recent joint resolution in the House proposed the following
Constitutional amendment:
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The Supreme Court itself has addressed the issue of school prayer six
times, including four times in the last fifteen years.3 Whereas the earlier
cases concerned the more straightforward issue of school children reciting
state-led prayers on a daily basis, recent decisions have addressed more
refined issues of prayer in school. In a series of three decisions from the
mid-80s to early-90s, the Court struck down a moment of silence statute
clearly designed to promote school prayer,4 upheld the right of high school
students themselves to form a religious club that would involve voluntary
prayer on campus,5 and struck down a state-initiated and directed prayer at
graduation." In deciding these cases, the Court extended the earlier
prohibition on recitation of state-composed prayer to any significant
attempt by the state to promote or sponsor prayer in public schools. On the
other hand, it clearly affirmed the right of students to initiate and lead
prayer in a voluntary setting at school.
The Court's most recent school prayer case came in 2000 with Santa
Fe Independent School District v. Doe, where it held that a school district
policy allowing students to vote on whether to have a prayer at home
football games violated the Establishment Clause.7 The school district's
policy was an apparent effort to avoid the Court's concerns about state-
directed prayer emphasized in Lee v. Weisman by shifting the decision
whether to pray, and who was to pray, over to the students. Nevertheless,
the Court found that the voting scheme suffered from the same two defects
identified in Lee. First, despite letting students vote on whether to pray, the
Court said the policy, when seen as a whole, was clearly designed to
promote school prayer and had the state's imprint upon it' Second, the
Nothing in this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit individual or
group prayer in public schools or other public institutions. No person shall
be required by the United States or by any State to participate in prayer.
Neither the United States nor any State shall prescribe the context of any
such prayer.
H.RJ. Res. 12, 107th Cong. (2001). For similar examples, see S.J. Res. 3, 105th
Cong. (1997); H.R.J. Res. 20, 105th Cong. (1997).
3 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226 (1990); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel, 370 U.S. at 421.
4 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38.
5 See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 226.
6 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 577.
7 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 290.
" See id. at 304-07.
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state-promoted prayer resulted in coercion of those attending football
games and was therefore unconstitutional.'
In the Santa Fe decision, the Court reiterated its continuing resolve to
prohibit state-promoted prayer in public schools, even in arguably less
intrusive settings."0 This is in contrastto the Court's substantial dismantling
in recent years of prior prohibitions on aid to religious schools, which is the
other major Establishment Clause arena.'1 The Santa Fe decision thus
9 See id at 310-13.
10 See id at 317.
"The largest number of Supreme Court Establishment Clause cases have con-
cerned aid to religious institutions and schools. In a series of decisions in the 1970s
and 1980s, the Court scrutinized aid programs quite closely, invalidating a number
of programs where a religious institution might directly benefit from aid or where
provision of aid might be interpreted as placing the state's imprimatur on religion.
This included aid that might supplant a current expense and thereby free up money
for religion, provision of instructional materials to religious schools themselves
instead of to parents or to students, and the presence of state employees on school
grounds where an impression of endorsement might be created. See, e.g., Aguillar
v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (invalidating program providing publicly employed
Title I teachers to teach remedial secular classes at religious schools); Grand
Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (invalidating program in which
public school employees provided secular services on religious school grounds);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (invalidating provision of instructional
materials directly to religious schools); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (invalidating aid for tests designed by religious
teachers on secular subjects).
In recent years, however, the Court has substantially lessened its scrutiny in this
area, permitting a number of aid programs that might have been suspect in earlier
years. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (upholding
provision of a sign interpreter to deaf student at a religious school); Witters v.
Wash. Dep't ofServ. forthe Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (holding thatprovision of
aid to blind student enrolled in religious school does not violate the Establishment
Clause). Most significantly, in its two most recent decisions the Court has
overruled prior decisions in upholding aid programs. In Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997), the Court upheld a program providing publicly employed Title I
teachers to teach remedial classes at religious schools and, in doing so, specifically
overruled its previous decisions in Aguillar and Ball, which had invalidated such
programs. Moreover, in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), a divided Court
upheld a state program which loaned educational materials and equipment,
including library, media, and computer materials, to religious schools. In doing so,
the plurality specifically stated that the effect of the decision was to overrule the
Court's prior decisions in Meek and Levitt which prohibited essentially the same
sorts of programs. Id. at 808.
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reflects the Court's own recognition of the highly sensitive concerns
presented by government-promoted prayer in public elementary and
secondary schools, most particularly the coercion of nonadherents that
easily occurs when the state involves itself in the prayer business.
At the same time, Santa Fe repeatedly affirmed the right of students
themselves to engage voluntarily in prayer activities in school. 2 Indeed, the
Court in several places suggested that there was a critical constitutional
distinction between voluntary student prayer on the one hand, and state-
sponsored prayer on the other. 3 This same distinction had been recognized
in earlier cases" and is certainly consistent with the outcome of the school
prayer cases.
It is the thesis of this Article that the distinction between voluntary
student prayer on the one hand, and state-sponsored prayer on the other, has
arguably become, and indeed should be, the central consideration in
analyzing school prayer cases. Not only was this distinction emphasized by
the Court in Santa Fe and prior cases, but it perhaps best explains the
Court's results in the cases. More importantly, the distinction is one which
best balances the competing constitutional concerns that are potentially
present in school prayer cases. In particular, it guards against the primary
Establishment Clause concerns presented by some school prayer-govern-
ment-created orthodoxy and compelled religious activity-while preserving
the important free speech rights of students.
The distinction is also one which overlaps substantially, though not
precisely, with concerns about state coercion and endorsement of religion,
both of which have played roles in the Court's school prayer cases. For
obvious reasons, both coercion and endorsement are predicated on the
state's involvement with the challenged religious practice. Indeed, the
coercion analysis used in Santa Fe and Lee consists of two parts, the first
of which is showing a substantial state involvement with the challenged
12 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 313 ("Thus, nothing in the Constitution...
prohibits any public school student from voluntarily praying at any time before,
during, or after the schoolday. But the religious liberty protected by the Constitu-
tion is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular religious
practice of prayer.").
'3 See id. at 302, 313.
'4 See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250
(1990) (O'Connor, ., plurality opinion) ("[T]here is a crucial difference between
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids,
and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect."); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-88 (1992)
(emphasizing high degree of state involvement with challenged prayer).
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prayer." Conversely, where students initiate prayer, the state is not
coercing anyone and problems of endorsement are minimized. Yet a focus
on the distinction between voluntary student prayer and state-promoted
prayer would not require a showing of coercion and therefore prohibits
more state activity than a pure coercion test. And while significant
endorsement concerns would almost always be predicated on state
promotion, to the extent that mere accommodation of student prayer on
school property might raise endorsement concerns, focusing on the
distinction between voluntary student prayer and state-sponsored prayer is
somewhat less restrictive than a pure endorsement standard.
Part I of this Article will first examine the five school cases prior to
Santa Fe.'6 Part II of the Article will then examine the Santa Fe decision
more in-depth. 7 Part III will discuss the dual concerns of accommodating
both Establishment and free speech concerns in resolving school prayer
issues." Finally, Part IV will examine remaining prayer scenarios in public
schools, focusing on three particular areas: student religious clubs, moment
of silence statutes, and graduation prayers with student speakers.19
I. BACKGROUND: THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASES
Among the various church-state issues that have come before the
Supreme Court in modem times, there is none more sensitive than that of
religion in public schools. Indeed, the Court itself has frequently noted that
public schools are a highly sensitive Establishment Clause arena and for
that reason it "has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with
the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools."2 It is not
surprising, therefore, that the Court has closely monitored such activity and,
in all but one case, struck down religious activities in public schools,
including the posting of the Ten Commandments," teaching of
creationism, Bible reading, and prayer.24
's See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302-06; Lee, 505 U.S. at 586-90.
16 See infra notes 20-124 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 125-83 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 184-261 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 262-345 and accompanying text.20 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987).
21 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
22 See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 578; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
2' See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).




At the same time, the Court has recognized that we are religious people
and that religion is an important part of American life. It has made clear
that this does not justify state-sponsored religious practice, but it does
permit some accommodations of religious activity. Thus, although the
Court has been quick to strike down state-promoted religious practices, it
has frequently emphasized that students themselves are free to express their
religion in school.26 Moreover, the Court in Lee v. Weisman stated that
"throughout the course of the educational process, there will be instances
when religious values, religious practices, and religious persons will have
some interaction with the public schools and their students."27
Therefore, though closely monitoring religion in public schools, the
Court has indicated that complete separation is neither possible nor
desirable. Although the Court has addressed this balance in several distinct
public school contexts, none is more central and problematic than that of
school prayer, which had come before the Court five times prior to Santa
Fe. This subsection will review those five decisions and the stage they set
for the Santa Fe case.
A. Engel v. Vitale and Abington School District v. Schempp
The Supreme Court first struck down school prayer as unconstitutional
in two landmark decisions in the early 1960s, Engel v. Vitale28 and
Abington School District v. Schempp.? In the first case, Engel, the Court
reviewed a school board policy requiring that the following prayer be said
aloud by each class at the start of the school day: "Almighty God, we
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon
us, our parents, our teachers and our Country."'3 The school district itself
had adopted this practice upon the recommendation of the New York State
Board of Regents, which included it as part of their "Statement on Moral
and Spiritual Training in the Schools." '3 The required prayer recitation was
challenged as unconstitutional by the parents often district students, who
' See Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306,313 (1952) ("We are areligious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.").26 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,313 (2000) ("[N]othing
in the Constitution as interpreted by this Court prohibits any public school student
from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday.").
27 Lee, 505 U.S. at 598-99.
2 Engel, 370 U.S. at 421.29Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
30 Engel, 370 U.S. at 422.
31 Id. at 423.
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alleged that use of the official prayer was contrary to the religious beliefs
of both themselves and their children. 2
In finding that this practice violated the Establishment Clause, the
Court began by focusing on the fact that students were required to recite a
government-composed prayer. The Court noted that, at a minimum, the
Establishment Clause means that "it is no part of the business of govern-
ment to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to
recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government."'33 In
finding this contrary to principles of religious freedom found in the
Constitution, the Court discussed in-depth how the "practice of establishing
governmentally composed prayers for religious services was one of the
reasons" early colonists left England and was an ongoing concern in the
early colonial experience.' Thus, according to the Court, the First
Amendment was in part designed to prohibit government from using its
power "to control, support or influence the kinds of prayer the American
people can say."35
Significantly, the Court did not premise its holding on any possible
coercion of students. It acknowledged that even when students were asked
to be excused there might be a significant indirect coercion to conform to
the officially approved religion,"' but it emphasized that the Establishment
Clause went much further than prohibiting coercive activities. Unlike the
Free Exercise Clause, which the Court suggested requires a showing of
government coercion, the Establishment Clause is violated by establishing
32 1d
331d. at 425.
3' Id The Court noted that the Book of Common Prayer, which was created by
the English government, set out in detail the form and content of prayer to be used
in the Church of England. This resulted innumerous controversies in which various
religious groups attempted to influence the book to advance their own religious
views. Other groups left England to avoid conformance with the required practices.
Id at 425-27. The Court further noted that it was "an unfortunate fact of history"
that some of the religious groups which fled the established English church, once
here, themselves created state-established churches and at times sought to impose
their beliefs on others. Id at 427. These earlier colonial experiences of the
problems of established churches and official religious practices were apparent at
the time the First Amendment was adopted. See id. at 427-30.
35Id at 429.361 d at 431 ("When the power, prestige and financial support of government
is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon




an official religion, whether or not it coerces nonobserving individuals."
Thus, even though the Court acknowledged that indirect coercion might
have existed in Engel, it rested its decision on the official establishment of
religion through prescribed prayer.
Finally, the Court addressed the argument that prohibiting school
prayer indicated a hostility toward religion. The Court responded that the
contrary was true, stating that it was precisely because prayer and religion
were so important that the religion clauses were created, ensuring that
people "could pray when they pleased to the God of their faith in the
language they chose."'38 The First Amendment was therefore not designed
to destroy or to hamper religion, but to end governmental control of it,
leaving people free to pursue religion as they chose.
One year later, in Abington School District v. Schempp,39 the Court
again examined the issue of religious practices in public schools. There the
Court reviewed two consolidated cases, both involving opening exercises
in public schools that included daily readings from the Bible and recitation
of the Lord's Prayer. The Bible reading was done over a school intercom
system by selected students, who chose what passage to read, while the
Lord's Prayer was said over both the intercom and in unison by the students
in their classrooms. Participation in these exercises was voluntary, with
students being given the option to remove themselves from the classroom
or to remain but not participate in the exercises.'
As in Engel, the Court held that these religious practices violated the
Establishment Clause. It began its analysis by stating that the First
Amendment requires that government be neutral toward religion and then
proceeded to review at length how prior Establishment Clause cases
reflected such a neutrality requirement a' Based on those cases, the Court
then articulated a two-fold test for withstanding an Establishment Clause
challenge: first, "there must be a secular legislative purpose;" and second,
the government act must have "a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion." 2 These requirements, of course, are the first two prongs
of the now famous Lemon tripartite test for resolving Establishment Clause
issues. Indeed, Lemon itself largely relied upon Schempp and one subse-
quent case in articulating the test.43
37 See id. at 430-3 1.
3 1 ld at 434.
39 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
40 See id at 205-08.
41 See id at 215-22.
42 Id at 222.
43 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), the Court stated the
following three-prong test for evaluating the validity of a statute under the Estab-
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The Court then proceeded to hold that the religious exercises in
question violated this standard, although it was not precise in stating how
or in what manner the violation was found. As a practical matter, once the
religious character of the activity was established, the Court rather
summarily concluded that for the state to sponsor and direct the exercises
clearly violated the Establishment Clause." Despite the lack of analysis,
this was clearly the correct result, especially in light of Engel. Whatever
secular purpose might be articulated for the practices, and certainly some
are conceivable, there is little doubt that the state sponsorship of such
activities clearly advanced religion. Moreover, the exercises violated the
neutrality principle emphasized by the Court throughout the opinion since
the state was actively involved in promoting religion.
Taken together, Engel and Schempp established that state-sponsored
prayer in public school violates the Establishment Clause. Although the
Court was sensitive in both decisions to the problem of coercion, neither
one was predicated on that basis.45 Rather, it was government involvement
in promulgating official prayers and therefore religious views, whether
coercive or not, that violated the Establishment Clause. At the heart of both
decisions was the concern that government itself had no business compos-
ing or sanctioning official prayers, and that the First Amendment was
designed to end government control of religion. Thus, whatever else the
Establishment Clause might mean, it clearly prohibited the state trying to
influence how children prayed.
Although far-reaching in some respects, the precise facts of Engel and
Schempp concerned state-sponsored and prescribed religious practices in
school itself on a daily basis. It was unclear, therefore, how the Court
would deal with other issues where the prayer was not prescribed, where
the students rather than the school sponsored the religious exercise, or
where prayer occurred only on special occasions outside the classroom.
lishment Clause: "First the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute mustnot foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion."' (citations omitted). In stating the first two prongs, the Court cited
its decision in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,243 (1968), which itself
had relied on Schempp. The excessive entanglement prong came from the Court's
decision in Walz v. Tax Commissioner ofNew York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
" See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223 ("We agree with the trial court's finding as to
the religious character of the exercises. Given that finding, the exercises and the
law requiring them are in violation of the Establishment Clause.").
41 The Court made clear in Schempp, as it had in Engel, that a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause requires a showing of coercion, while the Establishment
Clause does not necessarily require that coercion be shown. Id.
2001-2002]
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Those issues were partially addressed in a series of relatively recent
decisions beginning with Wallace v. Jaffree.
B. Wallace v. Jafflee
The Court's next school prayer case came almost a quarter-century
after Engel and Schempp, in Wallace v. Jaffiree. There the Court reviewed
an Alabama statute that required a minute of silence in public elementary
and secondary schools for the purpose of "meditation or voluntary
prayer."' The statute in question was actually the second of three Alabama
statutes relating to school prayer noted by the Court. An earlier statute was
similar to that being challenged, but only referred to "meditation" and did
not mention prayer,48 whereas a third statute provided for a teacher-led
prayer,49 the unconstitutionality of which the Supreme Court had already
affirmed.50 It was only the statute providing for "meditation and voluntary
prayer' during a minute of silence that was before the Court.5
In many respects, the statute in Wallace avoided some of the most
serious concerns identified in Engel and Schempp. Most notably, no prayer
or reading was prescribed, and thus any prayer that might occur was
completely of a student's own choosing. This avoided the problem of
prescribed prayer very much at the heart ofEngel and Schempp. Moreover,
since no content was provided, there was no endorsement of an official
religious view, a significant concern inSchempp. Finally, although coercion
was not the focus of either of the earlier decisions, to the extent it might be
a consideration, it seemed to be nonexistent in Wallace since no one would
know how any particular student used the minute of silence.
Despite all of these distinctions, the Court held that the statute violated
the Establishment Clause. It began its analysis by reference to the tripartite
test announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which states that to be valid a statute
' Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).47Id. at 40. The challenged statute stated:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all
public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class
is held may announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in
duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during
any such period no other activities shall be engaged in.
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1984).48 See ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.
49 See id. § 16-1-20.2 (1989).
'o See Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (1984).
51See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 41-42.
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must (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster an excessive entanglement
with religion.52 Using this formulation, the Court in Wallace held that the
"prayer and meditation" statute failed to have a secular purpose and
therefore declared it unconstitutional without examining the second and
third prongs of the test.'
In finding that the statute failed to have a secular purpose, the Court
noted that a statute might be partially motivated by religion and still satisfy
the purpose test, but it is invalid if it is entirely motivated by a religious
purpose.' 4 The Court then proceeded to give two reasons why the record
indicated that the statute was entirely motivated by a purpose to advance
religion. First, the legislative record itself clearly indicated that the sole
purpose of the statute was to put prayer back in the schools. Indeed, the
bill's sponsor inserted into the legislative record a statement that the bill
was an "'effort to return voluntary prayer' to the public schools."' He
confirmed this before the District Court, where he stated that he had no
purpose in mind other than returning prayer to the schools. The rest of the
legislative record showed no other purported purpose.56
Second, the Supreme Court also considered the purpose of the statute
in relation to the prior statute requiring a minute of meditation. The Court
noted that the only significant difference between the challenged statute
and the prior one was the addition of the words "or voluntary prayer."
Moreover, the Court stated that the prior statute already protected a
student's right to engage in prayer during the moment of silence at the start
of the school day. The Court concluded that adding the phrase "or
voluntary prayer" in the challenged statute served no purpose other than "to
convey a message of state approval of prayer activities"58 and was thus
unconstitutional.
Wallace, therefore, made clear that the state could not promote school
prayer in any manner, even where it left the content entirely up to the
individual student. Although the statute in question was in some respects
far removed from many of the central concerns identified in Engel and
Schempp, it nevertheless conveyed a message of endorsement and was, in
52 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
5 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56.
54 See id
" 
5d at 57 (citation omitted).
56 See id at 56-57.
s7 See id. at 59.58 See id. at 61.
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essence, used to promote prayer. Moreover, as noted by the Court, the
statute clearly violated the Court's longstanding requirement of neutrality
toward religion since, by its very terms, it was promoting prayer. 9
It is important to emphasize, however, that Wallace did not declare all
moment of silence statutes or practices to be unconstitutional, but only
those that were clearly designed for no other purpose than to promote
prayer and thereby advance religion. Indeed, the Court seemed to suggest
that the earlier Alabama statute, which required a daily moment of silence
for meditation, was constitutional even though students might use the time
for prayer. In distinguishing the first statute from the one it struck down,
the Court stated that an "intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of
course, quite different from... voluntary prayer during an appropriate
moment of silence," ° a right which it said the prior statute protected. The
general validity of moment of silence statutes was more expressly stated in
concurring opinions by Justices Powell and O'Connor, both of whom
explicitly stated that moment of silence statutes can be constitutional, even
if individual students use them for the purpose of prayer.6'
Therefore, although the earlier Alabama statute providing only for a
moment of silence was not before the Court, the Court in Wallace appeared
to support the validity of moment of silence provisions as long as their
primary intent was not to promote prayer, even if as a consequence some
students choose to pray during that time.62 Such a position makes sense
since the statute is not promoting prayer as such but a moment of silence,
" See id. at 60 ("Such an endorsement is not consistent with the established
principle that the government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward
religion.").
60 Id at 59.
61 Most significant was Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, which dis-
cussed at length moment of silence statutes, stating that they should be constitu-
tional as long as they were not used to promote or endorse prayer. In discussing
their general validity, she noted that, unlike prayer, a moment of silence provision
is not inherently religious, and that students are completely free to participate in
any manner they choose. Id at 67-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Powell's
concurrence, which focused on other concerns, briefly stated at the beginning that
he agreed with O'Connor's "assertion that some moment-of-silence statutes may
be constitutional," a position which he interpreted the majority opinion as
suggesting. Id at 62 (Powell, J., concurring).
62 The majority was clearly not bothered by the fact that students might choose
to pray during a required moment of silence, as indicated by the statement that-the
earlier meditation statute "protect[ed] every student's right to engage in voluntary
prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during the schoolday." Id at 59.
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which might serve several secular purposes, and such a provision could not
reasonably be interpreted as endorsing prayer. Moreover, the choice to pray
as well as the content of the prayer would belong solely to the student.
C. Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens
The Court's next examination of the school prayer issue came in Board
of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens," a 1990 case.
There the Court examined whether the Equal Access Act," passed by
Congress several years earlier, was violated when a high school prohibited
a student religious group from meeting on campus and if the Act, so
construed, violated the Establishment Clause.' As such, the case presented
the distinct, yet critical, issue of whether student-initiated, rather than state-
initiated, prayer and religious activity poses an Establishment Clause
problem.
The basic constitutional issue presented in Mergens was whether
permitting a student religious group to meet on campus on terms equal to
those of other student groups violated the Establishment Clause. The high
school in question had a policy of permitting a variety of student groups to
meet on campus after school on a voluntary basis. Altogether, about thirty
such groups were recognized, including a chess club, a scuba diving club,
a photography club, and several service clubs." The respondent, Bridget
Mergens, sought permission to form a Christian club at the school for the
stated purpose of reading and discussing the Bible, having fellowship, and
praying together.67 The school denied the request, stating that permitting
such a club at the school would violate the Establishment Clause."
The first issue before the Supreme Court was whether the school's
refusal to recognize the religious club violated the Equal Access Act,
passed in 1984. The Act required that once a school created a forum
for student clubs to meet, access could not be denied to a group be-
cause of its content, including religious content.69 In Widmar v.
63 Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a)-(b) (1998).65Mergens, 496 U.S. at 231.
66 See id67 See id at 232.
"See id at 233.
69 The Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal
financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal
access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who
2001-2002]
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Vincent," the Supreme Court had recognized this as a constitutional prin-
ciple when applied to student religious groups on university campuses.
7
'
The Equal Access Act, in essence, applied the same standard to high
schools. Construing the Act in a broad fashion as clearly intended by
Congress, the Court in Mergens found that the school's refusal to allow the
religious group to meet violated the Equal Access Act.'
The second issue before the Court was whether the Equal Access Act,
construed to require that student religious groups have the same access to
school facilities as other groups, violated the Establishment Clause. The
school argued that because the recognized clubs were an integral part of its
educational mission, official recognition of a religious club would amount
to school endorsement of the club and "provide the club with an official
platform to proselytize other students." In particular, the school argued
that since the club would meet under school aegis, "an objective observer
wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the
religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such
meetings.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
o Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
71 In Widmar, the Court held that a public university could not prohibit a
religious group from using campus facilities when use of such facilities was
extended to non-religious groups. The Court stated that although the university
could regulate access to facilities, such regulation must be content-neutral. The
university failed to do this because it discriminated against religious speech. In so
holding, the Court expressly stated that religious worship is a form of speech under
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 269.
' A majority of the Courtjoined that part of Justice O'Connor's opinion which
found that the school district's refusal to recognize the religious club violated the
Equal Access Act. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that a"limited open
forum" exists when a school" 'grants an offering to or opportunity for one or more
noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during
noninstructional time,"' and therefore the Act prohibited denial of access based on
the content of speech. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 235 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b)).
The Court construed the term "noncurriculum related student group" broadly,
saying it included any student group that did not "directly relate" to the curriculum.
Id at 239. Although some of the recognized clubs directly related to the curricu-
lum, the Court noted that several other recognized groups, including the Chess
Club, Scuba Diving Club, and the Peer Advocates Club did not. Id, at 245-47.
Since such noncurricular student clubs had been approved, it violated the Equal
Access Act to refuse recognition to a club because of its religious content. Id. at
247.
73 1d at 247-48 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
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in the position of a secondary student" would perceive official support for
and endorsement of the meetings. 4
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding 8-1 that the Act did not violate
the Establishment Clause, but with no opinion gaining a majority of the
Court. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, for four members of the Court,
said that the logic of the Court's earlier decision in Widmar v. Vincent,
involving university students, applied with equal force in the secondary
school setting." In Widmar, the Court held that permitting a religious group
to meet on a university campus on the same basis as other student groups
did not violate the Establishment Clause under the tripartite Lemon test.
The Court stated that providing equal access to religious groups served the
secular purpose of promoting free speech' and avoided entanglements with
religion that would occur if the university tried to police the content of
meetings.' Moreover, granting religious groups equal access to facilities
did not communicate endorsement but, rather, neutrality and therefore did
not have aprimary effect of advancing religion7 The Court in Widmar also
noted that the broad spectrum of approved groups helped dissipate
endorsement concerns. 79
Justice O'Connor said that the above analysis was equally applicable
to high school groups under the Equal Access Act."0 She noted that the
avowed purpose of the Act, to prevent discrimination against religious and
other groups, was clearly secular.8 Most importantly, the plurality said that
there was no problem of advancing religion through endorsement, stating
"there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect."' Moreover, secondary school students, like university students,
are mature enough to recognize "that a school does not endorse or support
student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis."' The
4 Id. at 249 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
71 Id. at 248 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
16 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271.
7Id at 272.
78 Id at 273-74.
7 Id at 274.
80 See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) ("We think
the logic of Widmar applies with equal force to the Equal Access Act.").
s' Id at 248-49 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
2Id. at 250 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
83Id (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
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plurality also noted that the broad spectrum of student groups represented
dissipated any possible problems of endorsement that might exist.'
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the judgment
that there was no Establishment Clause violation, but on somewhat
different grounds than the plurality. Whereas O'Connor's plurality opinion
primarily focused on why there was no endorsement of religion under the
facts, Kennedy focused on a coercion standard, expressly rejecting
O'Connor's endorsement test as inappropriate for Establishment Clause
analysis.85 Instead, Kennedy stated that the relevant Establishment Clause
test is "whether the government imposes pressure upon a student to
participate in a religious activity. '8 6 Under that standard, there was nothing
in the facts to suggest any coercion whatsoever since participation in the
club was completely voluntary and outside normal school hours.8"
Finally, Justice Marshall wrote a concurring opinion,joined by Justice
Brennan. He stated that the Equal Access Act simply codified what was
already constitutionally required under the Free Speech Clause--prohibit-
ing discrimination against religious clubs on the basis of content 8 He also
indicated that the Establishment Clause was not violated by allowing a
religious group to meet, but that concerns were raised in the secondary
school context distinct from universities that called for precautionary
measures by schools. 9 In particular, he believed that because the problem
of perceived endorsement was greater in the more structured environment
of a high school, schools needed to take special steps to disassociate
themselves from religious groups through explicit disclaimers." Thus,
" See id. at 252 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
85 See id at 260-61 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
" Id. at 261 (Kennedy, J., concurring).7 Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
8 See id. at 262 (Marshall, J., concurring).
89 See id at 262-63 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall believed that the
"wide-open and independent character of the student forum" in Widmar, which
involved a variety of controversial groups that were in no way encouraged by the
university, was quite distinct from the forum in Mergens. Id at 265. In the latter
instance, the school made no effort to disassociate itself from the groups and even
encouraged the formation of extracurricular student groups as part of its overall
mission. Id at 266-67. The danger of perceived endorsement was quite real and
required special effort by the school to disassociate itself with religious groups. Id
at 267.
90 See id at 269-70 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall stated that the
school could either stop encouraging student participation in clubs generally and
communicate that the clubs do not relate to the school's mission or, if it continued
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according to Marshall, the Establishment Clause did not act as a barrier to
the group meeting, but instead imposed an affirmative obligation on the
school to clearly disassociate itself from the group.9'
Mergens, therefore, clearly established that student-initiated religious
activity in a noncurricular setting does not pose Establishment Clause
problems, at least where it is part of a larger student forum of activities and
groups. Although the justices differed somewhat on the precise rationale,
the basic message of the different opinions was the same: when students,
rather than the state, initiate the prayer and other religious exercises, the
Establishment Clause is not violated. Moreover, the Court strongly
suggested that not only was the Establishment Clause not violated under
such circumstances, but also that denying the students the right to meet
might well violate their rights of free speech. The plurality opinion made
this point well, stating, "there is a crucial difference between government
speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and
private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect."'
D. Lee v. Weisman
The final school prayer case to come before the Court prior to Santa Fe
was Lee v. Weisman,93 a 1992 decision. There the Court reviewed a school
district policy which permitted school principals to invite clergy to offer
invocation and benediction prayers at middle school and high school
ceremonies. The specific incident giving rise to the case involved the
principal of a middle school who invited a rabbi to pray at the graduation
ceremony. The principal gave the rabbi a pamphlet containing guidelines
for the prayers and also told the rabbi that the prayers should be non-
sectarian. The parent of a graduating student challenged inclusion of the
prayers as violating the Establishment Clause.9'
The Supreme Court agreed, voting 5-4 that inclusion of state-controlled
prayers at middle or high school graduations violated the Establishment
Clause 5 In doing so, however, members of the Court divided over the
its general endorsement of student clubs, it could explicitly disclaim endorsement
of the religious club. Id. at 270.
91 Id (Marshall, J., concurring).
I Id at 250 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
I Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
94 See id at 581-84.
95 See id at 586-87. For an excellent series of articles discussing Lee v.
Weisman and its impact on religion in public schools, see Symposium, Religion
and the Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 699-1020
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scope of Establishment Clause prohibitions on prayer in school, leaving
some doubt as to the scope of the Court's decision and the appropriate
standard to apply in future cases. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion struck
down the challenged prayer under a coercion standard, stating that in the
context of a graduation ceremony a state-controlled prayer constituted an
indirect, but substantial, coercion of religious exercise.96 Although four
otherjusticesjoined his opinion, agreeing that the coercion involved in the
challenged practice violated the Establishment Clause, they were careful to
emphasize in two concurring opinions that although a showing of coercion
was sufficient to violate the Establishment Clause, it was not necessary, and
that a violation can also occur under an endorsement test.97 The four
dissenting justices found the practice constitutional, apparently conceding
that coercion would violate the Establishment Clause, but finding none
present in this case.98
In analyzing the challenged practice under a coercion test, Kennedy's
majority opinion engaged in atwo-part analysis. First, he discussed at some
length the pervasive and substantial state involvement with the prayer in
the case.99 The principal, an agent of the state, decided that prayer should
be offered. The principal also chose who would offer the prayer. " Finally,
by providing the pamphlet on prayer guidelines and telling the rabbi the
prayer should be nonsectarian, the state attempted to control the content
of the prayer. 1 ' This was particularly troubling to Kennedy, who stressed
that it was a "cornerstone principle of our Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence" that government had no business composing prayer.10 Thus,
although the prayer was delivered by a private citizen, Kennedy's majority
opinion concluded that the state was pervasively involved in it at several
levels.
Kennedy then turned his attention to the effect that this state-controlled
prayer had on student participants. After discussing the Establishment
Clause's historical role in guarding against the infringement of conscience
(1993) (articles by Jonathan L. Entin, George W. Dent, Jr., Joanne C. Brant, John
H. Garvey, Stanley Ingber, Michael StokesPaulsen, DanielO. Conkle, IraC. Lupu,
Richard S. Myers, Rodney K. Smith, Edward B. Foley, and Ronald C. Kahn).
9 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 592-94.
97 See id at 599-609 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id at 609-31 (Souter, J., con-
curring).
9
" See id. at 631-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99 Id at 586-88.
1oo Id at 587.
101 Id. at 588.
10 2 Id
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and belief by state-created orthodoxy, 3 Kennedy emphasized the
heightened concerns that subtle coercive pressure presents in public
elementary and secondary schools."° He then stated that the government's
extensive involvement and control ofthe ceremony put substantial pressure
on students to engage in actions that they themselves might understand as
participation. Althoughthis pressure was indirect since no one was required
to stand or otherwise be involved, it was nonetheless real and substantial. 5
Moreover, the fact that graduation ceremonies were not compulsory did
little to address the problem of coercion since high school graduations play
a uniquely significant role in our society and could hardly be considered
voluntary in the normal sense of the word."° Thus, Kennedy concluded that
the graduation prayers in this case constituted substantial, albeit indirect,
coercion of dissenting students that violated the basic principles of the
Establishment Clause.
As noted above, although four otherjusticesjoined Kennedy's opinion,
agreeing that the coercive effect of the graduation prayers violated the
Establishment Clause, in their concurring opinions, Justices Blackmun and
Souter emphasized that coercion was a sufficient, but not a necessary,
condition for a violation. 7 Souter's opinion, joined by Stevens and
O'Connor, in particular stressed that the mere endorsement of religion,
even without coercion, is enough to violate the Establishment Clause.0
103 See id at 591-92. The Court noted that, unlike speech in general, the
Constitution contemplated that government was not to be a participant in religious
discussion or debate since religious establishments threatened the religious liberty
of all. "A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that freedom of belief and
conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed."
Id at 592.
"4 Id The Court noted that the problem of indirect coercion is not necessarily
limited to public schools, "but it is most pronounced there." Id '"What to most
believers may seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever
respect their religious practices, in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever
or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a
religious orthodoxy." Id
105 Id at 593.
101 Id. at 594-95.
107 See id at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Although our precedents make
clear that proof of government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment
Clause violation, it is sufficient."); id at 619 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that
the Court's precedents "simply cannot... support the position that a showing of
coercion is necessary to a successful Establishment Clause claim").
o' Justice Souter's concurrence examined two issues in-depth: (1) whether the
Establishment Clause only prohibited preferences among religions but permitted
aid to religion in general; and (2) whether a showing of coercion is necessary to
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This was essentially a continuation of the same debate two years earlier in
Mergens, where O'Connor's plurality opinion in essence applied an
endorsementtest,,o while Kennedy's concurrence argued that endorsement
alone was not enough and that coercion was necessary.' ° Although
Kennedy was not that explicit in Lee, presumably to get the otherjustices
to join his opinion, there appeared to be little doubt that Kennedy was still
championing a coercion test while the other justices in the majority would
include an endorsement standard as well."'
prove an Establishment Clause violation. Id at 609. Examining both Court
precedent and the history surrounding the Establishment Clause, Souter persua-
sively argued that the Establishment Clause prohibits general, as well as preferen-
tial, advancement of religion, See id at 609-18.
Regarding the coercion issue, Sourter conceded the force of some of the
arguments for the "coercion" analysis but again believed that both precedent and
history supported a position that a showing of coercion was sufficient but not
necessary. In doing so he noted that since the Free Exercise Clause already
protected against state coercion of religious practice, "a literal application of the
coercion test would render the Establishment Clause a virtual nullity." Id. at 621.
He also relied heavily on the fact that both Jefferson and Madison strongly
disfavored various noncoercive state actions that nonetheless supported religion.
See id at 622-25.
The final section of Souter's concurrence emphasized the principle of
neutrality, which requires that "the State may not favor or endorse either religion
generally over nonreligion or one religion over others." Id at 627.
o See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,247-53
(2000) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
"o See id at 258-62 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
." Despite Kennedy's emphasis on coercion, some commentators have read the
majority opinion as not solely resting on coercion, but as suggesting that the prayer
was also invalid because of the state's involvement. In particular, they have read
the parts of the opinion emphasizing the degree of state involvement with the
prayer as establishing an independent basis for invalidation, rather than being part
of the overall coercion analysis. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 865, 875-79 (1993); Ronald C. Kahn, God Save Us From the
Coercion Test: Constitutive Decisionmaking, Polity Principles, and Religious
Freedom, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 983, 998-1000 (1993). Admittedly, Justice
Kennedy was less than clear on how the state's extensive involvement with the
challenged prayer related to his discussion of coercion. However, he began his
analysis by stating that "[t]hese dominant facts mark and control the confines of
our decision," and then identified that state officials directed the prayer and that it
was coercive. Lee, 505 U.S. at 586. This strongly suggests that it was a combina-
tion of the two that was the basis for the decision, which would appear to be
affirmed by the general tone of Kennedy's opinion as well as the apparent need for
the concurring opinions to distance themselves from the coercion test.
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Importantly, however, even those justices advocating inclusion of an
endorsement standard emphasized the state's role in such a test. Thus, both
Justice Blackmun's and Justice Souter's concurring opinions spoke in terms
of the problems of official state prayers constituting an unconstitutional
endorsement of religion."' In this respect, Souter's opinion stressed
endorsement as adimension of the broader requirement of neutrality toward
religion, which, according to Souter, is clearly violated when government
itself endorses a particular view."3 Indeed, Souter suggested in a footnote
that endorsement would not occur if a student speaker privately chose a
religious message to deliver at graduation, stating: "If the State had chosen
its graduation day speakers according to wholly secular criteria, and if one
of those speakers (not a state actor) had individually chosen to deliver a
religious message, it would have been harder to attribute an endorsement
of religion to the State."" 4
The four dissenting justices, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, disagreed
with each of the majority's primary grounds for finding coercion, arguing
that the state did not direct and control the prayer in question and disputing
at length the majority's conclusion that students were coerced to partici-
This, of course, does not mean that Lee established that both prongs of
Kennedy's analysis must be there to show an Establishment Clause violation. What
it means, however, is that the invalidation of the prayer in Lee was based upon a
combination of both substantial state involvement in the prayer and its coercive
effect.
"
2 In discussing endorsement concerns that occur with school prayer, Justice
Blackmun consistently used language suggesting the state's own active participa-
tion in the prayer. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("But
it is not enough that the government restrain from compelling religious practices:
It must not engage in them either."). Justice Souter also emphasized the state's
active involvement when discussing endorsement concerns. See, e.g., id at 629-30
(Souter, J., concurring) ("[T]he government's sponsorship of prayer at the
graduation ceremony is most reasonably understood as an official endorsement of
religion....').
"3 While the Establishment Clause's concept of neutrality is not self-
revealing, our recent cases have invested it with specific content: the State
may not favor or endorse either religion generally over nonreligion or one
religion over others. This principle against favoritism and endorsement
has become the foundation of Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
ensuring that religious belief is irrelevantto every citizen's standing in the
political community.
Id. at 627 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
"t Id at 630 n.8 (Souter, J., concurring).
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pate."5 More fundamentally, however, the dissent said that historically the
type of coercion necessary to violate the Establishment Clause was
"coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law
andthreatofpenalty,"...6 which was completely missing in this case. Scalia
also distinguished the graduation prayers from the earlier Engel decision
where students were compelled to attend school by law, the prayers took
place in an instructional setting, and parents were absent, all of which
presented concerns about state interference with the right of parents to
direct their children's religious upbringing, a concern not at all present in
Lee."
17
Although invalidating graduation prayers of the type involved in that
case, the divisions within the Court in Lee created some uncertainty about
the proper test for resolving Establishment Clause issues in the public
schools. The only clear point of a majority agreement was that five
members of the Court said that the type of coercion present in Lee, in which
the state controlled a religious exercise which put indirect, but substantial,
pressure on students to participate, violated the Establishment Clause."' In
essence, this is the coercion test previously championed by Justice
Kennedy. Although prior decisions indicated that coercion was sufficient
but not necessary for proving an Establishment Clause violation,' 9 only
four members of the Court articulated such a position in Lee, arguing that
endorsement continued to be a separate and viable Establishment Clause
test. For that reason, some commentators suggested that the Kennedy
coercion test had, in effect, become the appropriate Establishment Clause
standard since it was the only one to garner a clear majority of the Court.20
Lee also left uncertain whether religious exercises, such as prayer,
might be permissible when involving less state control. Kennedy's majority
I,5 See id at 637-40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
",
6 See id at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
".
7 See id at 643-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"' Even this is disputed by some commentators. See supra note 11.
19 See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,430-31 (1962).
'
20 See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 795,
819-45 (1993) (suggesting that Lee replaced the Lemon test with a coercion test);
Rodney K. Smith, Conscience, Coercion and the Establishment of Religion: The
Beginning ofan Endto the Wandering ofa Wayward Judiciary?, 43 CAsE W. RES.
L. REv. 917,930-35 (1993) (arguing Lee as evidence of the Court's movement to
coercion standard). But see Conkle, supranote 111, at 874-79 (stating that Lee did
not replace the Lemon test with a coercion test); Kahn, supra note 111, at 994-1008
(same).
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opinion discussed at length the various ways that the state was involved in
the challenged prayer, suggesting that such state involvement was a
necessary prerequisite for a finding ofcoercion.' The concurring opinions
also discussed state involvement as a significant factor under the endorse-
ment test.2' This is in contrast to Mergens, where student-initiated
religious activity, characterized by the plurality as private versus govern-
ment speech, did not raise Establishment Clause concems.'2 Thus, Lee
appeared to leave open the possibility of prayer at graduation and other
school-related events if coming from students themselves rather than
government1 24 That set the stage for the Santa Fe decision.
II. SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT V DOE
.A. Facts and Procedural History
The litigation in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe"s began
in 1995 when the parents of two students sought a restraining order
prohibiting prayer in violation of the Establishment Clause at upcoming
graduation exercises. The complaint alleged that the school district
permitted a number of unconstitutional religious activities in the schools,
'
2
'See Lee, 505 U.S. at586 (statingthatthe decision was confined by two domi-
nant facts: the state's involvement with the prayer and its coercive effect on
students).
" See id at 604-09 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 619-27 (Souter, J., con-
curring).
" Bd. ofEduc. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,250 (2000)
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
124 In his dissent, Justice Scalia said that, "[g]iven the odd basis for the Court's
decision," all that would need to be done to make graduation prayers constitutional
would be an announcement or written insertion stating "while all are asked to rise
for the invocation and benediction, none is compelled to join in them, nor will be
assumed, by rising, to have done so." Lee, 505 U.S. at 644-45 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Scalia's interpretation of the majority opinion is quite questionable and
likely wrong. Not only would such an announcement completely fail to address the
endorsement concerns of the concurring justices, but it also would not likely
address the indirect coercion concerns of Kennedy's majority opinion. Given his
discussion of the psychological effects on participating students, it seems unlikely
that a statement telling people they need not join would be sufficient.
As noted in the text, however, a substantial question remained after Lee
regarding the validity of prayers lacking the substantial state involvement that
existed in Lee.
125 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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including prayer at graduation ceremonies and at home football games.'
In response, the district court entered an interim order, which, among other
things, permitted "non-denominational" prayer at graduation by students
selected by the graduating class. 27 In response to the district court order,
the school district enacted a policy for graduation ceremonies which
established a bifurcated student election on prayer. First, students would
vote, by secret ballot, on whether to have an invocation and benediction as
part of the graduation ceremony. Second, if the class chose to have a
prayer, then it would elect by secret ballot, from a list of student volunteers,
students to deliver the prayers."2
Several months later, the school district adopted another policy, entitled
"Prayer at Football Games," which was essentially the same procedure to
govern prayer at home football games. As with graduation ceremonies, it
first provided for a student election on whether to have prayer at home
football games, and if the student body so chose, a second election to
decide which student would deliver the prayer."' Like the policy on
graduation prayer, the football game policy did not contain a provision
requiring that the prayer be nonsectarian, but it had a fallback provision
requiring that the prayer be nonsectarian if the initial policy were enjoined
on that basis. "0
Pursuant to this policy, the student body elected to have prayer at
football games and chose a student to deliver the prayer. A short time later,
the school district revised the policy slightly, deleting the word "prayer"
from the title and referring to "messages" and "statements" as well as
"invocations" in the text. Otherwise it remained the same, and it was this
policy in its final form that eventually came before the Supreme Court."'
The district court enjoined enforcement of the first policy on the
grounds that it permitted sectarian prayers that would coerce other students
"
6 Id at 295. The complaint alleged that, in addition to allowing students to
give sectarian Christian prayers at graduation ceremonies and football games, the
school district permitted several incidents where teachers promoted religion or
chastised students forholding minority religious beliefs. In particular, ateacherhad
promoted in class attendance at a Baptist revival and had ridiculed a student for
holding a minority religious belief. The teacher was subsequently reprimanded by
the school district, however. See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806,
810 (5th Cir. 1999).
117 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 296.
121 See id. at 296-98.
129 See id at 297.
130 See id.
131 See id at 298.
[VOL. 90
PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Lee. It permitted the fallback
policy, however, which contained the provision that all prayers must be
nonsectarian, reasoning that anonsectarian prayer would not coerce anyone
to support a particular religious perspective.3
2
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found both versions of the
policy unconstitutional, with and without the limitation to nonsectarian
prayers.' In doing so, it relied on Fifth Circuit precedent, which drew a
distinction between student-initiated prayer at graduation ceremonies,
which was permissible, and prayer at sporting events, which was not.'34 In
Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District,3 5 the Fifth Circuit had
upheld a policy which provided for student-led prayer at graduation
ceremonies if nonsectarian and adopted by a vote of the students,'36
essentially the same policy adopted by the Santa Fe School District for
graduation ceremonies. But in a subsequent decision, the Fifth Circuit had
limited that policy to graduation ceremonies only because of the unique and
solemn nature of such events and did not apply it to sports events, which
the court considered neither unique nor solemn.'37 On that basis, the court
of appeals in SantaFe struck down the prayer policy for football games.'38
The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, limiting its review
only to the school district policy for football games.'3 9
B. Holding and Analysis
The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, affirmed, holding that the policy
permitting student-led prayer at football games violated the Establishment
Clause.4" In finding the policy unconstitutional, the Court emphasized two
distinct, but related, tests. The first and dominant part of the Court's
analysis applied the coercion analysis developed in Lee, first examining at
'
32 See id at 299.
133 See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999).
'
34 See id at 823.
13 Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
136 See id. at 972.
137See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 406-07 (5th Cir.
1995).
13 Doe, 168 F.3d at 823.
39 The Supreme Court in Santa Fe specifically stated that its decision was
limited to the policy for pregame prayer at sporting events. Santa Fe Indep. Sch.




length why the prayer was government, and not private, speech,141 and then
discussing why it was an indirect, but substantial, coercion of those
attending football games." Second, the Court also said the policy was
facially invalid for two additional reasons: because by promoting prayer it
lacked a secular purpose under Lemon" and because "it impermissibly
impose[d] upon the student body a majoritarian election on the issue of
prayer.'"
44
The Court began by establishing that the school prayer policy was
unconstitutionally coercive under the principles established in Lee. 14' The
discussion began with an extended analysis of why the prayers in ques-
tion were not merely private speech but were the result of significant
state involvement, as in Lee." In doing so, the Court rejected what
appeared to be the school district's primary argument, that the prayers in
question were private, not government, speech, and thus were governed by
Mergens rather than Lee. In particular, the school district argued that
permitting the students to decide whether to have prayer acted as a "circuit-
breaker," in effect cutting off any state involvement in the decision and
turning it over to the students. 47 This arguably made the process distinct
from that in Lee, where the Court emphasized that the school principal
decided whether to pray and who was to pray and gave advice on how to
pray. According to the school district, the circuit-breaker mechanism
avoided all those concerns by turning each of the decisions over to the
students. 4 1
The Supreme Court rejected that argument, characterizing the prayer
as public speech. 49 Although the Court agreed with the Mergens's plurality
that "there is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech
endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
14 See id. at 301-10.
142 See id at 310-13.
14 See id at 314-15.
'44Id at 316.
'45 Id at 302. The Court began its analysis by stating that "our analysis is pro-
perly guided by the principles that we endorsed in Lee." Id The next two sections
of its analysis then closely tracked the two-part coercion test established in Lee. See
I d at 302-10.
'46 See id at 301-10.
'
47 See id at 305.
'48 See i d at 305-06.
141 Id at 309-10.
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protect,""' the Court rejected the private label in this case for several
reasons. First, the prayer could not be justified under the Court's public
forum doctrine, although in several previous cases the Court had permitted
religious speech on school property when part of a broader forum.'5 The
pregame ceremony was quite different than the fora giving rise to protected
student speech in other cases, such as Mergens, Widmar v. Vincent, and
Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia,'53 each of which
involved clearly religious activity within a broader forum of student
groups.54 Although the Court acknowledged that even a single speaker
might qualify as a limited public forum ifa free range of opinions could be
expressed, that was not the case here.' Rather, by submitting the decision
to a student vote, the school district assured that only majoritarian views
would be expressed and that minority views would be silenced."
150 Id. at 302 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226,250 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)).
"' See id at 302-04. According to the Court, those previous cases established
that a student's contribution to a government created forum is not government
speech, even if it is "authorized by a government policy and take[s] place on
government property at government-sponsored school-related events." Id at 302.
52 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273-75 (1981) (indicating that a public
university cannot prohibit a religious group from using campus facilities when such
use of facilities are extended to non-religious groups).
53 Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). The Court
in Rosenberger held that to deny funding to a religious student publication while
giving funding to non-religious studentpublications constituted content discrimina-
tion and violated the free speech rights of the religious group. Id at 837. Moreover,
to provide funding to the religious publication did not violate the Establishment
Clause since the state would not be favoring religion but would be treating it
neutrally. Id at 845.
The Court in Santa Fe distinguished Rosenberger and other public forum
cases by noting that there was no intention "to open the [pregame ceremony] to
'indiscriminate use,'... by the student body generally." Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 303
(quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,270 (1988)). Rather,
the school district policy allowed only one student to give the invocation the entire
season, subject to restrictions on the content and topic of what was said. See id
"' Id at 304 ("Granting only one student access to the stage at a time does not,
of course, necessarily preclude a finding that a school has created a limited public
forum.").
156 See id at 304-05. The Court stressed how it had long stated that "fimdamen-
tal rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections." Id (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638
(1943)). In particular, it had noted earlier in the same term, in Board of Regents of
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The Court then proceeded to analyze the actual degree of state
involvement with the pregame prayer, focusing on two basic concerns.
First, and most significant, the Court emphasized several ways in which the
school district encouraged and promoted the prayer in question. Although
the students voted on whether to have a prayer, the decision to have a vote
at all was made by the school district, 5 thus initiating a process that was
in all likelihood going to result in a decision to pray. Moreover, by stating
that the purpose of the pregame ceremony was to "solemnize the event," the
policy appeared to invite religious messages.'58 Further, the only type of
message specifically mentioned in the text of the policy was an "invoca-
tion," commonly understood as a prayer.'5 9 Thus, there was no doubt that
the students were being asked whether they wanted prayer, with the very
question itself being a form of endorsement of the practice."6
Second, the Court noted that endorsement of the pregame ceremony
was also fostered by the setting in which it was delivered. The prayer
involved "a large audience assembled as part of a regularly scheduled,
school-sponsored function conducted on school property.'' The Court
recognized several other ways that the school might be perceived as
involved, including use of the school's public address system; the team,
band, and cheerleaders dressed in uniforms bearing the school name; and
the likelihood of signs, banners, and even articles of clothing reflecting the
school colors and name. 62 Relying on the "objective observer" standard
associated with the endorsement test, the Court concluded that "an objec-
tive Santa Fe High School student will unquestionably perceive the inevi-
table pregame prayer as stamped with her school's seal of approval.' 63
University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000), the
problematic nature of student elections determining free speech rights. See Santa
Fe, 530 U.S. at 304.
117 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 306-07.
'
58 Id. at 306 (citation omitted).
119 See id. at 307.
160 See id
161 Id. at 307.
162 Id. at 307-08.
'
63 Id. at 308. In reaching this conclusion it was unclear whether the Court con-
sidered this second group of factors enough, by themselves, to create a perception
of endorsement, or whether they merely lent further support to the Court's earlier
discussion of the school district's actual involvement in the prayer. The Court was
also less than precise in how it was using the endorsement analysis at this point. In
rejecting the school district's argument that the pregame ceremony involved only
private speech, the Court emphasized in several places that the effect of the
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After establishing that the pregame ceremony was government-
promoted, rather than private, speech, the Court rather quickly explained
why it was coercive and therefore unconstitutional under Lee. First, the
Court rejected the school district's argument that there was no coercion
because the prayers were the result of student choice.' The analysis used
to show why the "circuit-breaker" argument failed to make the speech
private also demonstrates why the school is not insulated "from the
coercive element of the final message."'" Second, the Court rejected the
argument that there was no coercion because attendance at football games
was voluntary and lacked the informal pressure to attend that a graduation
would have. The Court pointed out that, in fact, a number of students
typically are required to attend games, such as players, bandmembers, and
cheerleaders. However, even if attendance were completely voluntary, the
Court noted the important role such extracurricular activities play in high
school, which creates both a strong desire to participate and even social
pressure to be involved. The Court stated that the state cannot take advan-
tage of this pressure to coerce those present to participate in a religious
exercise. 1'
government's involvement was to create a perception of endorsement, even using
the "objective observer" test at one point. See id at 308. However, nowhere did the
Court clearly indicate that this endorsement alone lead to an Establishment Clause
violation. Rather, the Court indicated that endorsement helped to establish the
state's involvement in the prayer, a necessary prerequisite to the coercion
discussion that followed, although the Court did state near the end of this first part
of its analysis that "[s]chool sponsorship of a religious message is impermissible
because it sends the ancillary message" to nonadherents that they are outsiders. Id
at 309. More broadly, the Court did not appear to use the endorsement standard as
an independent ground for striking down the pregame prayer. See id
Several reasons support reading the endorsement discussion in Santa Fe as
simply further evidence of state involvement under the coercion test, rather than
being an independent basis for invalidating the pregame prayer. First is the absence
of any clear statement by the Court that it was an independent basis. Second, the
Court proceeded to discuss the problem of indirect coercion, which would have
been unnecessary if endorsement itself was a basis for invalidation. At a minimum,
the Court should have clarified that the coercion problems were an additional
ground for finding the practice unconstitutional, but it instead treated it as central
to its holding. Finally, it is hard to believe Justice Kennedy would have joined the
majority opinion given his previous explicit statements that endorsement is not
enough to show an Establishment Clause violation. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside
Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,260-61 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
'"Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309-10.
,' Id at 310.
'6 See id at 311-12.
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Finally, in the last section of the opinion, the Court gave two reasons
why the policy was facially invalid, responding to a school district
argument that any challenge was premature because there was no certainty
under the latest version of the policy that any of the statements would be
religious. 67 First, the Court indicated that the clear purpose of the policy
was to promote prayer and thus failed the first prong of the Lemon tripartite
test, which requires that government acts have a secular purpose.' The
Court emphasized concerns previously discussed under the first part of its
coercion analysis, in particular noting that by specifying invocations, the
policy was asking for a vote on prayer and not establishing a content-
neutral limited forum. 69 Moreover, the Court said that it could not ignore
the history leading up to the policy and the context in which it was adopted,
which left no doubt that it "was implemented with the purpose of endorsing
school prayer." 170
Second, the Court also found the policy facially invalid because the
election process permitted a majoritarian view to be imposed on religious
minorities. According to the Court, this turned the school into a forum for
religious debate and undermined essential protection of minority view-
points.'7 1 The Court noted that it had already held unconstitutional a student
referendum policy that placed minority viewpoints at the mercy of the
majority,"7 and that the election scheme in Santa Fe posed essentially the
same problem. 3 Thus, the mere establishment of a voting scheme "which
entrusts the inherently nongovernmental subject of religion to a majori-
tarian vote" violated the Constitution. 74
C. Summary
Although somewhat disjointed in its approach, the Court's decision in
SantaFe established three distinct grounds for finding the school's election
167 See id at 313-16. As noted earlier, subsequent to the election of a student
speaker to deliver a prayer, the school district revised its policy to omit the word
prayer and insteadreferto 'messages, "statements," and "invocations. Id. at 298.
,
68 See i at 314-16.
169 See id at 315-17.
170 1d at 315.
'71 ICL at 304.
17 See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 429 U.S. 217, 235
(2000).
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on prayer at football games unconstitutional. First, the majority's decision
focused on the coercive and therefore unconstitutional nature of any prayer
that might be offered. The Court essentially applied the two-step coercion
analysis established in Lee, examining in-depth the type and degree of state
involvement with the prayer in question and then discussing its coercive
effect upon attending students. 5 Second, the Court found that the prayer
policy itself was facially unconstitutional because it was clearly designed
to promote prayer and thus lacked a secular purpose.7 6 Third, the Court
held that structuring a vote that permitted majoritarian religious views to
be imposed on religious minorities violated minority rights."n
Though largely fitting within prior Establishment Clause analysis,
Santa Fe clarified the parameters of analysis in several important respects.
First, it made clear that simply turning over to students the final decision
on whether to pray or who was to pray did not negate broader state
involvement. Although, on the surface, the Santa Fe School District's
policy seemed to address some of the central concerns about state
involvement expressed in Lee, the Court was correct in examining the
broader school policy. Similarly, the Court clarified that coercion concerns
were not limited to mandatory or de facto mandatory activities, but also
applied to activities of an admittedly more voluntary nature that can be
viewed as part of ordinary student life. This made sense since such students
are still put in the untenable position of having to choose between activities
commonly associated with high school life and being subjected to state-
sponsored religious activities.7"
That being said, the real and most fundamental message of Santa Fe is
simply this: The state has no business promoting prayer in schools and any
attempt to do so will be unconstitutional. That message is not new, of
course, but the Court said it with particular force and made clear the extent
to which it is willing to apply the principle. Thus, not only does this
prohibit the state itself from deciding whether to pray, but it prohibits
giving that decision to students in a way that promotes prayer. Moreover,
the Court reiterated what had been made clear in Wallace-any state
attempt to promote prayer would be unconstitutional.
In sending this message, however, the Court made it clear that state
involvement in prayer made the prayer in Santa Fe unconstitutional-not
171 See id at 301-13.
'
76 See id at 314-15.
,n See id at 316-17.
171 See id at 311-13.
2001-2002]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
prayer per se. At each stage of its analysis, the Court emphasized that it was
the state's own involvement with, and promotion of, prayer that was
problematic. Thus, in finding that any offered prayers would be unconstitu-
tionally coercive, the Court discussed at length the state's role in the
prayers. 79 Similarly, the policy was facially unconstitutional because it
involved state encouragement of prayer. 80 The Court even noted that its
finding that the majoritarian scheme was unconstitutional was predicated
on its earlier analysis that "the resulting religious message underthis policy
would be attributable to the school" and not to students.'18
Conversely, while suggesting that the state's own promotion of prayer
was inevitably unconstitutional, the Court stressed throughout the
opinion that a student's own choice to pray within appropriate fora
was permissible. It began its analysis by agreeing with the Mergens
plurality statement that "there is a crucial difference between government
speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and
private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect."'82 At the end of its coercion analysis, the Court again
stressed this fundamental distinction, stating: "Thus, nothing in the
Constitution as interpreted by this Court prohibits any public school student
from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after the school-
day. But the religious liberty protected by the Constitution is abridged
when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of
prayer.' I8 3
Indeed, the Court in Santa Fe strongly affirmed the basic distinction
between truly student-initiated prayer on the one hand, and government-
sponsored prayer on the other. This distinction goes to the heart of
monitoring religious activity in public schools and has arguably becomethe
most significant factor in distinguishing between what is permissible and
impermissible. Therefore, although Santa Fe left no doubt that the state
itself has no business promoting prayer, even in the subtlest of ways, the
Court continued to affirm that students themselves can choose to pray when
truly the result of voluntary choice. The next section of this Article will
examine the dual establishment and free speech rationales supporting this
central distinction.
'9 See id. at 301-10.
'10 See id at 316.
8Id at 316 n.23.
Ild at 302 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226,250 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)).
"I Id at 313.
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Ill. ACCOMMODATING ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE
SPEECH CONCERNS: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN STATE-SPONSORED
AND STUDENT-INITIATED PRAYER
In analyzing the prayer in public school cases, the Supreme Court has
resorted to a variety of legal standards, including neutrality,'" the secular
purpose requirement from Lemon," coercion,"' and endorsement.' The
coercion and endorsement standards have been particularly significant in
recent years, with the Court explicitly applying a coercion standard in Lee
and Santa Fe accompanied by a strong endorsement undercurrent. Indeed,
two recent decisions, Mergens and Lee, involved a significant debate within
the Court over whether a coercion or endorsement standard should be
applied in resolving school prayer cases.188
Throughout these recent cases, however, the Court has frequently
alluded to another, perhaps more central, distinction between state-
sponsored and student-initiated prayer. This distinction formed the basis for
permitting the student religious club in Mergens. Moreover, the Court in
both Lee and Santa Fe affirmed this basic distinction between prohibited
government prayer and permissible student prayer. Indeed, the Court in
Santa Fe both began and concluded its analysis with reference to this basic
distinction, emphasizing the central distinction between prohibited
government prayer and permitted student-initiated prayer. 9
'" See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1985); Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,215-22 (1963).
'
8 s See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 55-56.
"'See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309-13; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-94
(1992).
1s7 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 618-26 (Souter, J., concurring); Bd. of Educ. of
Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248-52 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion); see also Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 307-08 (discussing endorsement
concerns).
"'See supra notes 63-124 and accompanying text.
s9 The Court began its discussion by quoting the Mergens plurality that "there
is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect." Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302
(quoting Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)). The Court
concluded its discussion by stating: "Thus, nothing in the Constitution as
interpreted by this Court prohibits any public school student from voluntarily
praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday. But the religious liberty
protected by the Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the
particular religious practice of prayer." Id at 313.
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Taken together, the six prayer in public school cases essentially
establish a central distinction between prohibited government prayer and
permitted voluntary student prayer. The clear message of Santa Fe, Lee,
Wallace, Schempp, and Engel is that the state has no business sponsoring,
promoting, or even encouraging prayer in public schools. This is true
whether the state itself tells students how to pray, as in the earlier cases, or
simply promotes prayer for students to say on their own. In either situation,
the Court has said that the state should not be in the business of prayer,
especially as it relates to schools. At the same time, Mergens clearly
affirmed that students themselves have a right to initiate private, voluntary
prayer in public schools. Not only does this not violate the Establishment
Clause, but denying student access to prayer when other groups are
permitted likely violates their free speech rights.
Thus, apart from discussions of coercion and endorsement, the school
prayer cases can be read as establishing a central distinction between
affirmatively sponsored school prayer, which the Establishment Clause
prohibits, and student-initiated prayer, which the Free Speech Clause
protects. This distinction is not necessarily at odds with the coercion or
endorsement tests since both coercion and endorsement concerns are
largely predicated on state involvement and are minimized or absent
altogether for student-initiated activities. But the distinction between state-
sponsored and student-initiated prayer focuses the relevant constitutional
inquiry and directly highlights the accompanying constitutional values.
In particular, use of the state-sponsored/student-initiated distinction as
the primary starting point for analyzing school prayer cases makes sense for
three reasons. First, the primary concerns that animate the school prayer
debate are ones that arise from the state's own involvement in prayer, not
from that of students.'" The most central concern is that the Establishment
Clause clearly forbids the state itself from promoting a particular religious
perspective, which state-sponsored prayer clearly does. The early prayer
cases, as well as Lee, strongly emphasized that the fear of any state-created
orthodoxy lays at the heart of concerns about school prayer. 9 ' Thus, the
" The Court's prayer decisions have long stressed the paramount concern that
government cannot require people to pray in a particular manner. See, e.g., Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,425 (1962) ("[I]t is no part of the business of government
to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as apart
of a religious program carried on by government.").
191 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 ("A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that
freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole assurance that religious faith
is real, not imposed."); Engel, 370 U.S. at 429 (explaining that the First Amend-
ment was designed to prevent government from using its power "to control, support
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most central dangers posed by school prayer are those triggered by
government's own active promotion of a religious perspective.
Second, the state-sponsored/student-initiated distinction best balances
the dual concerns of avoiding establishment problems while preserving
student autonomy and speech rights. Whereas the coercion and endorse-
ment analyses primarily focus on the Establishment Clause, the prohibited
state prayer versus student prayer distinction more clearly brings in the dual
concerns of establishment and speech. As a practical matter, these
constitutional mandates are not in competition with regard to school prayer;,
rather, they complement each other. Yet any attempt at establishing the
boundary between permissible and impermissible school prayer must
necessarily be informed by both Establishment Clause and free speech
interests, which the state-sponsored/student-initiated distinction does best.
Third, the distinction between voluntary student prayer and state-
sponsored prayer is also one that comports with the central First Amend-
ment principle of neutrality, a principle that bridges both Establishment
Clause and free speech jurisprudence. As noted earlier, government
neutrality toward religion is one of the oldest and most consistently applied
Establishment Clause principles," and in recent years it has arguably
become the Court's primary benchmark in analyzing Establishment Clause
issues. 3 Similarly, neutrality has long been the Court's principal focus of
or influence the kinds of prayer the American people can say").
" Neutrality as a central Establishment Clause principle was first stated in
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In fhct, neutrality was the basis
for the Court's holding. Id. at 18. In the years since Everson, the Court has
continued to emphasize neutrality as a central Establishment Clause principle. See,
e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,792-93
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,687-88 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664,669-70 (1970); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,222
(1963).
193 The past decade has seen the Supreme Court marginalizing, and even
ignoring, use of the Lemon test in Establishment Clause cases and, instead,
increasingly relying on a neutrality standard. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997); Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Bd. of
Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Zobrestv. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509
U.S. 1 (1993). For this reason, a growing number of scholars have suggested that
neutrality has become the Court's primary focus in resolving Establishment Clause
cases. See Carl E. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation
with Faith-BasedSocial Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 20-39 (1997); John
H. Garvey, What's Next After Separationism?, 46 EMORY L.J. 75, 81-83 (1997);
Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 75,
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free speech jurisprudence, with content-neutrality being the Court's
primary analytical tool.' In this respect, neutrality is a central analytical
bridge between Establishment and free speech concerns, both of which are
at play with regard to school prayer.
For all of these reasons, a focus on distinguishing between state-
sponsored and student-initiated prayer-a distinction the Court itself has
emphasized-is an eminently sensible starting point for setting the
boundaries between permissible and impermissible prayer. As established
by the Court itself, this distinction prohibits any state promotion of prayer,
no matter how minor. This is necessarily a more expansive prohibition than
that imposed by a coercion standard, which would additionally require a
showing of coercion. Although it has been lenient in finding coercion when
this standard is applied, the Court nevertheless only prohibits state-
promoted prayer that is coercive.
On the other hand, the distinction permits student-initiated prayer in a
voluntary setting. This does not mean that students can pray whenever they
want, no more than they can speak on any of a number of topics whenever
they want. 9 Rather, a student's right to speak, or pray for that matter, is
necessarily contingent on several variables, most notably an appropriate
forum for the speech."' In the context of school prayer, this is best
233-67 (1994); Dhanahjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33
HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 505, 515 (1998).
19 Both the Court itself and commentators have frequently noted that content-
neutrality is a central component of the Court's Free Speech jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994); Simon & Shuster,
Inc. v. Members ofN.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991); Boos
v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49
(1984); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,462 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 95 (1972); 1 RODNEYA. SMOLLA, SMOLLAANDNIMMERON FREEDOMOF
SPEECH § 3.2 (1996 & Supp. 2000); Geoffrey R. Stone, ContentRegulation andthe
First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 189-97 (1983); Susan H.
Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
615, 616-17(1991).
19s First Amendmentjurisprudence has long recognized that speech can be made
subject to reasonable, content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. See, e.g.,
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466
U.S. 789 (1984).
" Although the Supreme Court held in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), that the right to free speech
extends to high school students at school, it made clear that such speech is subject
to the school's educational function. Thus, speech that would disrupt school
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understood as involving a forum where prayer is one of several possible
responses left entirely to the initiative and choice of the students. Examples
might include prayer at the lunch table with friends or the creation of a
religious club as in Mergens 97
To date, each of the Court's school prayer cases clearly falls into one
of these two categories, with five cases involving impermissible state
efforts to promote prayer (Engel, Schempp, Wallace, Lee, and Santa Fe)
and one case involving permissible voluntary student prayer (Mergens). A
third possible category, falling somewhere between these two, would be
truly student-initiated prayer involving a captive audience. This raises
sensitive concerns on both sides of the issue and is the "blurred" boundary
in this area. Although the Court in dictum has suggested that such prayer
might be permissible in very limited situations, it has not clearly addressed
the issue.'"
The rest of this section will discuss each of the three categories of
school prayer suggested above. Subsection A will discuss why the Court
has correctly held that any state-sponsored prayer, even when relatively
minor, should be unconstitutional.19 Subsection B will discuss why truly
voluntary and student-initiated prayer in public schools poses no threat to
the Establishment Clause and, indeed, should be protected under the Free
Speech Clause.2' Subsection C will then look at some of the general
concerns in resolving the issue of student-initiated prayer with a captive
audience.01
A. Why State-promoted School Prayer is Unconstitutional
Prayer, by most accounts, is a good thing, and voluntary student prayer
in public schools is a constitutional activity. Why, then, has the Court
drawn what appears to be a rather rigid line prohibiting the state's own
efforts to encourage and promote school prayer, no matter how minor those
efforts might appear? This has included not only the more obvious cases,
where the state itself was telling students how to pray in admittedly
coercive environments, but also more recent attempts and arguably less
functions is not protected. Id at 509.
' See supra notes 63-92 and accompanying text.
'See infra notes 254-61 and accompanying text.19 See infra notes 202-22 and accompanying text.
200 See infra notes 223-53 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 254-61 and accompanying text.
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threatening situations where the state promoted prayer by students them-
selves.
On one level, of course, the answer is simply that even relatively minor
efforts to promote prayer violate broader Establishment Clause tests for
governing the proper relationship between church and state. In Wallace v.
Jaffree,2 2 for example, the Court struck down the Alabama statute
providing for a "moment of meditation and prayer" because it was clear
from the record that it completely failed to have a secular purpose under the
first prong of the Lemon test.2 3 Similarly, government efforts to promote
school prayer, no matterhowminor, obviously violate the central Establish-
ment Clause principle of neutrality since, in promoting prayer, the state has
taken the side of religion.2"
Thus, the prohibition on state-promoted prayer in public school cases
can, in part, be understood as simply one component of a broader judicial
attitude toward the proper relationship between church and state. The Court
has clearly indicated, however, that school prayer raises specific concerns
unique to its setting that reflect principles at the heart of the Establishment
Clause. At this level, school prayer arguably reflects the intersection of two
highly compelling concerns: the avoidance of state-created orthodoxy and
the particularly impressionable status of elementary and, to a lesser extent,
secondary school students. These two concerns, the dangers of state-created
orthodoxy and the impressionable status of school children, best explain the
particularly problematic nature of state-sponsored school prayer and the
Court's rigid enforcement against any state-initiated prayer.
The first of the two intersecting concerns is that the state has no
business promoting prayer because of the threat it poses to religious
freedom, a proposition that is both historically sound and eminently
sensible. Although the history leading up to and surrounding adoption of
the Religion Clauses is subject to significant disagreement on numerous
issues, it seems clear that one purpose was to preserve freedom of worship
and to avoid state-approved orthodoxy.2 5 Indeed, as emphasized in Engel,
202 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
203 Id at 56-61.204 See LAURENcEH. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALLAW 1170-71 (2d ed.
1988).
20 Despite the significant disagreement that exists over the original purpose of
the Establishment Clause, there is little doubtthat, at a minimum, the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses were designed to bar state orthodoxies in the form of
established churches that were found in Europe. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577,589 (1992) (noting that the First Amendment means that"religious beliefs and
religious expression are too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the
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Schempp, and Lee, the Establishment Clause was, in part, designed to avoid
the problems experienced due to the established churches in Europe from
which the early colonists fled.21 Central to this were concerns over state-
mandated beliefs and compelled worship. 27 Although our own colonial
history itself reflected some of those same concerns, by the time of the Bill
of Rights there was certainly a consensus that people should be free to
worship as their conscience dictated, without being told by government
what to do or not to do. In particular, this precluded government from
directing religious worship and exercises and from creating any orthodoxy
itself.
The threat to this freedom of worship by government-promoted prayer
should be apparent. To tell people how to pray, or even whether to pray,
creates a form of government orthodoxy in an area central to religious
expression. There is perhaps no more personal aspect of religion than
prayer, and to many it is closely related to the act of worship itself.28
State"); ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 55 (1990) (discussing the central concern of avoiding "govern-
mental coercion of conscience"). At the heart of such concerns was the idea that
people should be free to worship as they choose.206 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 588 ("It is a cornerstone principle of our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence that 'it is no part of the business of government to compose
official prayers ... ."' (citation omitted)); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,425-28
(1962) (providing an in-depth review of government-composed prayer as a primary
reason early colonists left England).
2 Constitutional historian Leonard Levy has forcefully argued that one of the
best indicators of the purpose behind the Religion Clauses were changes in state
constitutions immediately preceding the Federal Constitution. Levy has noted that
the American Revolution provided an opportunity for colonies to revisit their
constitutions and in many instances to address "pent-up" concerns over forced
establishments of religion. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 25 (1986).
Indeed, between 1776 and 1784 almost every state added provisions aimed at
eliminating or reducing church establishments. Although these provisions took
various forms, to the extent that they addressed specific concerns, they consistently
revolved around the dual concerns of compelled financial support of churches and
compelled worship. See, e.g., N.J. CoNST. of 1776 § XVIII, in THE COMPLETEBILL
OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES AND ORIGINS 25 (Neil H. Coogan ed.,
1997); N.C. CONST. of 1776 § XXXIV, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra,
at 30-31. See generally LEVY, supra, at 27-28.
2o8 See, e.g., EMIL BRUNNER, THE DIINE IMPERATIVE: A STUDY IN CHRISTIAN
ETHICS 313 (1947) ("Prayer is the breath of the believing soul."); JACQUES ELLUL,
PRAYERAND MODERN MAN 46-53 (C. Edward Hopkintrans., 1970) (discussing the
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Government involvement with prayer is therefore government involvement
with a core religious practice, one integrally involved with worship. For
similar reasons, for government to involve itself with prayer is in some
respect akin to establishing a state-approved orthodoxy since it touches
upon a central religious tenet.
This is true even when such prayer and worship are not compelled, but
only promoted by the state in a voluntary setting. Putting aside for the
moment the indirect coercion often experienced in voluntary contexts, the
government is still trying to direct and influence core religious practices.
This in itself is a form of state orthodoxy-the state is putting its stamp of
approval on a particular belief or variety of beliefs as correct and is trying
to influence its citizens in that regard. This path is constitutionally and
historically a very dangerous one to follow since, as innocuous as the start
may seem, it might well lead to substantial infringement of religious
freedom at some point. This concern was at the heart of the Court's
analysis in both Engel and Schempp and was strongly affirmed again in
Lee.209
There are, of course, different degrees of state involvement with prayer,
with some types of involvement presenting more serious concerns than
others. There is little doubt that the state involvement in Engel and
Schempp, where the state composed or selected a particular prayer for
children themselves to recite daily, was more egregious than the involve-
ment in Wallace, where time was given to students to pray on their own, or
in Lee, where those at a graduation ceremony had to listen to someone else
pray. The state's approval of orthodoxy is less obvious in the latter two
cases and the intrusion into personal beliefs less severe. Yet even when the
state merely advocates prayer in such ways, it is involving itself in a
sensitive and core arena of religious practice.
Moreover, as much as a state might want to, it is extremely difficult for
the state to avoid endorsing a particular orthodoxy. Beyond the obvious fact
that prayer itself represents a particular religious viewpoint, attempts by the
state to create nonoffensive and innocuous prayer themselves plunge the
state into the act of shaping prayer content in a way that is highly problem-
religious foundations of prayer).
"9 The concern that what might appear to be harmless prayers might eventually
lead to substantial infringement of religious freedom was particularly stressed in
Engel. There the Court acknowledged that the prayer in question might seem-
insignificant compared to the types of religious establishments commonplace 200
years ago but quoted from James Madison's warning that "[i]t is proper to take
alarm at the first experiment on our liberties." Engel, 370 U.S. at 436.
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atic. This was most apparent in Lee, where the Court properly chastised the
school district for advising the rabbi that the prayer should be nonsectarian
and for giving guidelines on how to pray at public occasions."' As well-
intentioned as such efforts are, they involve the state not only in promoting
prayer but in shaping its content. In doing so, the state has simply replaced
one orthodoxy with another one of its own making. As noted in Lee, the
fact that fewer people are offended does not make the situation any better,
especially since the sense of alienation for nonadherents will be even
greater.2 ' More fundamentally, for the state itselfto tell people how to pray
properly is a dangerous thought and one that strikes at the heart of the
Establishment Clause. Yet, caught in a dilemma between wanting to
promote prayer but not wanting to offend others, such state efforts to direct
the content of the prayers it is promoting will likely be a common
occurrence.
For all of these reasons, state involvement in prayer is a bad idea and
certainly raises concerns at the heart of the Establishment Clause. Yet what
makes school prayer especially problematic is its intersection with children,
who are particularly susceptible to the impacts of such state involvement.
The Court has permitted state-promoted prayer in other limited contexts,
most notably in Marsh v. Chambers,"' where it upheld against an
Establishment Clause challengethe practice ofopening legislative sessions
with prayer, emphasizing the long historical record of such practices.213
Where state-sponsored prayer involves school children, however, the Court
has emphasized the impressionable and vulnerable nature of such children
and therefore has guarded more carefully against concerns presented by
state prayer."4 Indeed, the Court has frequently characterized elementary
and secondary schools as being constitutionally sensitive in this regard,
calling for greater judicial scrutiny.215
210 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 588-89; see also Engel, 370 U.S. at 425 ("[1It is no part
of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of
American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by govern-
ment.").211 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 594.
212 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
213 1d at 795.
2 14 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 592; see also Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,261-62 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).2 15 See Edwards v. Aguillar, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987) ("The Courthas been
particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in
elementary and secondary schools.").
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The impressionable and vulnerable status of children is made apparent
in relation to the two themes of coercion and endorsement frequently
emphasized in the school prayer cases. As noted in Lee, the problem of
coercion might not be limited to public elementary and secondary schools,
"but it is most pronounced there."216 School children are susceptible to both
public and peer pressure to conform and will often not want to be thought
of as different from their peers. Thus, even where students are told they can
choose not to participate, there is an indirect, yet substantial, pressure to
conform.217 Students are therefore presented with a dilemma of participat-
ing or protesting. The Court in Lee reserved judgment with regard to
mature adults, but made clear that it was invalid with students.21 8
For similar reasons, endorsement concerns are most pronounced in a
school setting. Although it is unclear whether an independent endorsement
test is to be applied, endorsement concerns have been a consistent theme
in the decisions, most recently in Santa Fe.219 The essence of endorsement
analysis is that the state cannot endorse a particular religious perspective,
in part because it sends a clear message to those who might not share the
endorsed beliefs that they are "outsiders." ° These concerns are certainly
most pronounced with regard to school children. The less mature and more
impressionable nature of children increases the likelihood that they will
interpret state involvement as an endorsement of a religious view. This is
particularly true with younger children, though, depending upon the nature
of the state involvement, it might also occur at the secondary level. Perhaps
more significant, however, is that the effects of such endorsement-the
perception of being an outsider-are much greater for students.
The Court's heightened sensitivity about religion in schools is,
therefore, in part based on the impressionable nature of school children and
216 Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
217 See Geoffrey R. Stone, In Opposition to the School Prayer Amendment, 50
U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 835-37 (1983) (discussing coercive effects of state-promoted
school prayer).218 See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
219 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308-09 (2000).
'0 The Court's primary proponent of the endorsement test, Justice O'Connor,
has often stated that the problem with state endorsement ofreligion is that it "sends
a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political, community." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,69 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch). Otherjustices have expressed similar
concerns. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 606-07 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Also, the
majority in Santa Fe acknowledged this concern. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309-10.
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the concomitant coercion and endorsement concerns presented. Perhaps
even more fundamental, however, is the simple fact that the religious
upbringing of children is such an important and personal responsibility of
parents and family that the state should avoid any interference with it.
Justice Brennan alluded to such a concern in his concurring opinion in
Schempp, where he emphasized that the choices involved in sending a
student to a religious or secular school should be left up to the individual
parents, a policy that is frustrated when public schools interject prayer.22
This reflects the fundamental principle that, because of its extreme
importance and integral role in development of self, religious instruction
should be left in the hands of parents, free from state interference. When
the state promotes religious beliefs, however, it does exactly that, interject-
ing itself into the role of religious educator, a role historically and properly
reserved for parents. m
Perhaps more than anything else, this concern best explains the Court's
sensitivity to interjecting religion in public schools. As threatening as state-
created orthodoxy is, it is even worse when the state attempts to inculcate
religious values into children. State-sponsored school prayer, in any form,
does exactly that. In effect, the state is sending a message that one should
pray and, almost inevitably, how one should pray. To prohibit the state
from entering such an arena does not minimize religious values but simply
acknowledges that their formation is properly left to the family.
B. Free Speech and Student-initiated Prayer
In contrast to state-promoted prayer, students themselves might initiate
prayer in a voluntary setting. As noted above, the Court has clearly
indicated that such prayer is not only permissible, but is often protected
speech.?
2 SeeAbington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,241-42 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
222 The Court has recognized that our society places a high value on reserving
religious education to parents, free from state interference. See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972) ("[T]he values of parental direction of the
religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative
years have a high place in our society."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) (finding that the liberty interest of parents to direct the upbringing
and education of children includes the right to private religious education).
m See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302-03; Westside Cmty. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226,250 (1990).
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The right of students to initiate prayer within abroader forum of speech
opportunities is informed by both establishment and free speech jurispru-
dence. On the one hand, where students themselves choose prayer among
various speech options, the concerns animating Establishment Clause
juirisprudence are not present. Not only is the state itself not promoting
prayer, coercion and endorsement concerns are minimal or absent
altogether. The coercion analysis used in both Lee and Santa Fe was
predicated on the state's own active involvement in the prayer, 24 which is
not present when students initiate the prayer. Similarly, unlike state-
promoted prayer, which potentially carries a message of state endorsement,
student-initiated prayer carries no such message. If anything, the state is
merely endorsing students' free speech rights.P
More fundamentally, the state is acting neutrally when it permits
students to pray within a broader forum context. As noted earlier, neutrality
is one of the oldest and most important Establishment Clause principles,
playing a central role in the early school prayer cases, and has arguably
become the central Establishment Clause principle in recent years2 26 By
allowing students themselves to choose prayer among various options, such
as in the formation of student clubs, the state is steering a completely
neutral course. Indeed, to prohibit prayer while allowing other activities
reflects "not neutrality but hostility to religion."'227
On the other hand, student free speech concerns are strongly implicated
when students themselves choose prayer within a broader forum of options.
Students, of course, do not have a right to speak at any or all times in a
school. Speech rights are necessarily contextual, and this applies with
particular force in public elementary and secondary schools. 8 In the same
224 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302-10; Lee, 505 U.S. at 586-88.
' See Rosenberger v. Rector oftheUniv. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,841-42 (1995);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,274-75 (1981).
226 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839-44; Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet 512
U.S. 687,696-705 (1994); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10(1993); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,792-
93 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1970); Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,222 (1963). SeegenerallyEsbeck, supranote 193,
at 20-39.
227 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
m The Supreme Court has frequently stated that speech can be subject to
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288 (1984). The Court has indicated that this is particularly true with regard to
public schools, whose primary purpose is education, and speech interests must
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way that speech can be regulated in a content-neutral manner to serve
important societal interests, so too can it be regulated to avoid interference
with educational objectives. Thus, students can be prohibited from
disrupting class and can be required to conform to curricular assign-
ments.2 9
Yet student speech interests are clearly triggered when the school
provides a forum for broader speech activities. In such situations, the Court
has indicated that, once a forum is created, the state cannot discriminate on
the basis of speech content. 3 This is true even if the state was not required
to establish a forum to permit speech in the first instance. 3' Known as the
"designated forum" doctrine, the Court has consistently required in various
settings that, once a public forum is created for speech purposes, the state
cannot discriminate on the basis of speech content 32 Indeed, the require-
ment of content-neutrality has emerged as the most central concept in free
speech jurisprudence.33 Importantly, the Courthas applied this requirement
of content-neutrality to a variety of religious forms of speech, such as
proselytizing, the sale of religious literature, preaching, and worship, 1 4
making clear that prayer and worship are forms of speech for free speech
purposes.
As noted in Part I, the Court in Mergens did not expressly base its
decision on the Free Speech Clause, finding instead that the students' rights
yield to that broader objective. Thus, even though students do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), speech
cannot interfere with the school's educational objectives. Id at 509. Moreover, the
Court has also indicated that schools have substantial latitude in restricting vulgar
speech at school, see Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), and
in regulating speech in response to curricular or quasi-curricular activities. See
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,273 (1988).
229 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (schools can restrict speech that would "mater-
ially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school"); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 (schools can control
student speech as it relates to curriculum).
"30 See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 392-94 (1993).
"' Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,267-68 (1981).232 See SMOLLA, supra note 194, §§ 8.5-8.7.
" For discussion of the central role that the requirement of content-neutrality
has in free speech jurisprudence, see id. § 3.1; Williams, supra note 194, at 616-17.
234 See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263 (worship); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558 (1948) (preaching religious message by loudspeaker); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (distribution of religious leaflets).
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were guaranteed by a federal statute and that permitting them to meet for
prayer and other religious speech within the context of a broader forum did
not violate the Establishment Clause. The various opinions in Mergens
strongly suggested, however, that free speech rights were clearly impli-
cated. For example, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, though techni-
cally grounding the students' speech rights in the Equal Access Act,
nevertheless stressed the distinction between "government speech
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private
speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses protect. ' Justice Marshall's concurrence was even more explicit,
stating that the statute merely codified what was already constitutionally
required--that schools not discriminate between student-initiated groups
based on content. 7
Just as significantly, in several other recent cases the Court has
addressed instances in which religious speech rights were restricted within
a broader forum because of Establishment Clause concerns. In each case,
the Court held that not only was the Establishment Clause not violated in
such situations, but that restricting the religious speech violated the First
Amendment. Decided under the rubric of the Court's public forum doctrine,
the Court held in each of these cases that religious speech was to have
equal access to public fora. In doing so, the Court continued to affirm its
longstanding recognition that religious expression and practices constitute
speech for First Amendment analysis and thus must be treated neutrally.
Just as importantly, the Court made clear that treating religious speech
neutrally within a public forum does not pose Establishment Clause
concerns, even if clearly religious activities such as prayer and worship
occurred on public property.
The first of these cases, Widmar v. Vincent,"8 was the impetus for the
Mergens decision and was certainly influential in the Mergens analysis. In
Widmar, the Court held that a public university could not prohibit a
religious group from using campus facilities when use of such facilities was
extended to non-religious groups. In so holding, the Court both recognized
religious activities as coming within the protection of the Free Speech
Clause and emphasized thatthe First Amendment prohibited discrimination
23 See supra notes 69-90 and accompanying text.
16 Bd. ofEduc. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,250 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
" Id at 262 (Marshall, J., concurring).
218 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263.
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on the basis of speech content.29 It also specifically rejected the argument
that the Establishment Clause prohibited student use of campus facilities,
noting that permitting equal access to religious groups did not confer the
state's imprimatur.24 Thus, as long as the forum had a secular purpose,
providing equal access to religious speech not only did not violate the
Establishment Clause, but was compelled by the Free Speech Clause.241
In several cases after Mergens, the Court has continued to affirm that
religious speech must be treated neutrally and accorded equal access to
public property, including schools, and that doing so does not violate the
Establishment Clause. For example, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District,242 the Court held that a church could not be
denied use of a public school building for a film series on child-rearing
when the school was open to other groups. As in Widmar, the Court said
that free speech rights required that religious speech have the same access
to the forum as other speech,2 43 and that permitting the group to meet did
not violate the Establishment Clause. In particular, the Court found that the
requirements of Lemon were met, there was no danger of endorsement, and
any benefits to religion were incidental.2
Even more significant was the Court's decision in Rosenberger v.
Rector ofthe University of Virginia,245 where the Court applied a neutrality
analysis even when it involved direct government funding of religious
activity. In that case, a student group at the University of Virginia sought
funding for a newspaper that was clearly Christian in its message. The
University declined to provide the funding, saying that such direct financial
support violated the Establishment Clause.2' The Court, however, held
that, under the facts of the case, the Free Speech Clause required that the
university provide equal funding to the Christian group and that doing so
29 Id at 269-70.
240 Id at 274-75.
241 The Court succinctly summarized its decision in the following statement:
"Having created a forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks to
enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy
violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be
content-neutral, and the University is unable to justify this violation under
applicable constitutional standards." Id at 277.
242 Lamb's Chapelv. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
243 See id at 392-94.
244 See id at 394-95.
245 Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
216See id at 827.
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did not violate the Establishment Clause. In so holding, it viewed the
refusal to fund the religious newspaper as viewpoint discrimination247 and
once again employed a neutrality analysis in finding no Establishment
Clause violation.2' In particular, the Court stressed that the manner of
funding made perceptions of endorsement unlikely but was careful to limit
its holding to the facts of the case.249
Widmar, Lamb's Chapel, and Rosenberger all affirm the strong free
speech interest underlying the Mergens decision."0 Taken together, these
cases indicate that free speech principles require that religious speech be
afforded equal treatment relative to other permitted speech. Thus, even
though student speech can be appropriately regulated in schools to avoid
interference with educational objectives, once a forum is created for student
speech opportunities, religious speech, which includes prayer, cannot be
excluded. Moreover, the Court has consistently rejected Establishment
Clause justifications for prohibiting religious speech, noting that the very
neutrality concerns which require protection of religious speech in schools
also dissipate establishment concerns.'
Indeed, what is apparent from this analysis is that the existence of a
broader forum both dissipates Establishment Clause concerns and
strengthens free speech concerns. The very range of options that triggers
equal treatment for religious speech also works to minimize the endorse-
247 See id at 830-32.
See id at 838-44.249 The majority emphasized the program's neutrality, in which the Christian
paper was given funding on the same basis as any other student group, which made
it very different from the types of church funding issues at the time the First
Amendment was ratified. It also noted that the money was paid directly to the
printer and that the University had disassociated itself from the speech in question.
Id at 841-44. In a concurrence, Justice O'Connor was even more careful in limiting
the holding, noting three important limitations. First, the student group was clearly
independent of the university. Second, the payments went directly to a third-party
vendor and did not go directly to the group. Third, the large number and wide
variety of groups that received funding made it illogical to perceive that the
university endorsed any particular view. Id. at 849-50 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2o See also Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinnette, 515 U.S. 753
(1995) (plurality and concurring opinions said private display of cross in public
square, which was traditionally open to displays of other kinds, did not violate
Establishment Clause and was protected by Free Speech Clause).
'51 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819; Pinette, 515 U.S. at 753; Lamb's Chapel
v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 389 (1993); Bd. of Educ. of
Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981).
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ment concerns often discussed by the Court. Where students themselves
choose religious content from a range of options, the state is not promoting
religion but, instead, is only treating it neutrally relative to other speech
contents. Indeed, not to allow religious speech in such circumstances
arguably reflects hostility, rather than neutrality, toward religion.
It is important to note that the definition of a broader forum is
necessarily a loose one here, essentially meaning any context in which
students are given a range of speech options outside of a curricular setting.
The forum might be of a more formal nature, as in Mergens, or of a more
informal nature. For example, although schools rarely create official fora
governing lunch conversations, as a practical matter students sitting at
lunch tables with their friends are free to choose any topic of conversation.
For that reason, students should be free to pray together at lunch as one
choice among many that the students might make. The same would be true
for a number of other informal gatherings that might occur on school
property before, during, or after school hours, such as in a locker room,
parking lots, or between classes. As long as the prayer is not done in a
disruptive manner-essentially the same standard to apply to any other
speech content 2-- it should be viewed as a permissible student choice
within a broader range of speech options.
Significant speech interests might exist even when a single speaker is
involved, as long as he or she is free to choose from a range of speech
contents. This was recognized by the Court in Santa Fe, which stated that
granting a single speaker the stage does not necessarily preclude a limited
public forum, as long as the messages communicated are not limited by the
state.3 In such a situation, the core free speech principle of content-
neutrality strongly supports the student's autonomous choice of speech
content, even if religious in nature. And, as noted above, the range of
speech options that trigger equal treatment of religious speech minimizes
Establishment Clause concerns that might otherwise exist. Thus, regardless
of whether the Court's "limited public forum" doctrine would be triggered
by a single speaker, the relative balance of speech and establishment
concerns suggests permitting a religious message in such an instance.
The analysis is quite different, however, where the speech in question
is student-initiated but not within the range of options prescribed by a
forum. The school might permit such speech, of course, but the process of
"52 See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (implying
that schools can restrict speech that would "materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school").
253 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 304 (2000).
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doing so runs the danger of the state's own promotion. For example, a
student with no prompting from school officials might ask a teacher if he
or she can say a prayer in front of the class. This certainly qualifies as
student-initiated speech but does not trigger free speech rights. No student
has the right to speak to the class outside of a broader forum, whether the
content be prayer, advocacy of Marxism, or anything else. Moreover,
permitting the prayer runs the danger of the state's own promotion in ways
quite different than when a broader forum is involved. Not only are
perceptions of endorsement much stronger than when a student makes a
choice from a range of options, but the school's decision to permit the
prayer might well involve the school's own promotion.
There might be other ambiguous student prayer scenarios, but the
above example illustrates the general premise. Where students initiate
prayer as a response within a broader framework of speech options, then
permitting the prayer is not only consistent with the Establishment Clause,
but required underthe neutrality requirements of free speech. But where the
student initiates speech outside such a forum, the symmetry reverses. Not
only are free speech interests more minimal in such situations, but
Establishment Clause concerns are more pronounced.
The two general models so far examined in this section concern state
promotion of prayer, which is prohibited, and students' initiation of prayer
in response to a broader forum of speech options, which is permitted. The
typical examples in this latter situation, however, all involve voluntary
audiences, such as other participants in a religious club or around the
lunchroom table. A third possible model, somewhat falling between the
other two, is where students initiate prayer within a range of speech options
but do so with a captive audience. This is a less likely scenario, but it is still
possible and will be briefly examined in the next subsection.
C. Student Prayer and Captive Audiences
The analysis above suggests that strong grounds exist for granting
student-initiated prayer equal access to created fora within a public school
setting. As noted, however, this typically occurs in situations involving
voluntary audiences, such as religious clubs. Indeed, the Supreme Court
itself has not yet addressed a case involving purely student prayer with
captive audiences. The five cases in which the Court has held prayer
activities unconstitutional (Engel, Schempp, Wallace, Lee, and Santa Fe)
all involved the state itself promoting the prayer, while the one case in
which it upheld prayer activities (Mergens) involved student prayer in a
non-captive audience setting.
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There is no doubt that Establishment Clause sensitivities become
greater when a captive, as opposed to a voluntary, audience is the recipient
of the prayer. Although even the existence of voluntary religious activities
might appear intrusive to some, the ability to avoid exposure to any actual
content minimizes such concerns. In contrast, when a student is captive to
speakers because of the nature of the activity, such as with graduation
prayers, the student is forced to listen to the content against his or her
wishes. This is true whether the prayer in question is the result of state
promotion or of the truly autonomous choice of a student speaker.
On this basis, it might reasonably be argued that the combination of
prayer with the nonvoluntary or official status of a school function creates
a coercive environment so as to violate the Establishment Clause.
Although the state does not itself promote the prayer, the state's creation
of the setting in which the prayer might happen, together with the
requirement that nonadherents be present, is a sufficient state connection
to pose establishment concerns. Under this analysis, any prayer, whether
initiated by the state or by an autonomous student, would be impermissible
if delivered in a captive and quasi-official setting, such as graduation.
While there is certainly some force to this position, it is problematic for
several reasons. First, drawing the line in this way would appear to be
inconsistent with the Court's own jurisprudence in this area. Although the
Court has certainly been sympathetic to the captive audience situation with
unwilling members,- 5 it has never said that such situations are enough in
and of themselves to violate the Establishment Clause. Rather, the Court's
analysis has always presupposed the need to show state promotion of the
prayer in addition to any coercive effect. Specifically, the Court's analysis
in both Lee and Santa Fe applied what amounted to a two-part coercion
test, the first step examining the degree of state involvement with the
prayer, and the second showing the coercive effect of the prayer.' If the
captive audience by itself was sufficient to violate the Establishment
Clause, the Court's extended discussion in both cases of state involvement
was both unnecessary and even nonsensical. Indeed, lower court decisions
2 See Colin Delaney, Note, The Graduation Prayer Cases: Coercion By Any
Other Name, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1783, 1819-27 (1999) (arguing that even student
prayers should be seen as unconstitutional coercion).
2" See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 310-13; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-95
(1992); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962) (noting the
potentially coercive effect of school prayer on young children even when children
could have asked to be excused).
216See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 310-13; Lee, 505 U.S. at 586-88.
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subsequent to Lee either explicitly or implicitly assumed the necessity of
state promotion of the prayer in order for it to be viewed as unconstitution-
ally coercive."
That a captive audience does not by itself create an Establishment
Clause violation when religious messages are involved finds further support
in Justice Souter's concurrence in Lee. Joined by Justices Stevens and
O'Connor, Souter emphasized that, although coercion was a sufficientbasis
for finding an Establishment Clause violation, it was not a necessary one,
and an endorsement standard could be used. In doing so, however, he
strongly suggested that a religious message delivered by a student at
graduation, devoid of state influence, might well be constitutional. 28 This
makes little sense if the captive audience nature of graduation was itself
sufficient to create a violation. Thus, even those justices who desired a
broader Establishment Clause inquiry in Lee still recognized that a truly
student-initiated religious message would be constitutional even in a
captive audience setting.
The Court's own jurisprudence therefore presupposes the need for
some state involvement beyond mere creation of a captive audience
situation. This makes sense for several reasons. First, to the extent that the
distinction between state-sponsored and student-initiated speech best
" As will be discussed in Part IV.C, infra, there have been several federal
circuit court decisions involving graduation prayer subsequent to Lee, all of which
attempted to apply the Lee coercion testto the prayer policies in question. Although
courts split on the constitutionality of the various schemes, each decision devoted
substantial attention to whether the prayer in question could be attributed to the
state or not. Those decisions finding the prayers constitutional did so because of
a lack of the type of state involvement found in Lee. See Adler v. Duval County
Sch. Bd., 206 F. 3d 1070 (1 th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 531 U.S. 801 (2000);
Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (1998), opinion withdrawn,
reh'ggranted, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5051 (9th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Clear Creek
Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992). Similarly, those finding the prayer
schemes unconstitutional found significant state involvement in addition to a
coercive environment. See ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ.,
84 F. 3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th
Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 515 U.S. 1154 (1995). Common to all cases,
however, was a close examination of the degree of state involvement in the prayer,
in essence tracking the two-step coercion analysis established in Lee and




8 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 630 n.8 (Souter, J., concurring) (suggesting that if a
student speaker, chosen by secular criteria, had chosen to deliver a religious
message, it would be harder to show the state's endorsement).
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balances the respective establishment and free speech values at stake, that
principle applies equally to the captive audience situation. In particular, the
need for content-neutrality with respect to speech would apply with equal
force to the captive and noncaptive audience situation. Similarly, the
central Establishment Clause value ofneutrality is in no way compromised
in a captive audience context as long as religious speech is treated the same
as other speech. Indeed, to prohibit religious speech simply because of the
existence ofa captive audience would undercut the neutrality very much at
the core of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
Second, to the extent endorsement concerns inform Establishment
Clause thinking, they are not automatically triggered by the presence of a
captive audience. Rather, those Justices advocating endorsement concerns
have stressed examining the totality of circumstances to see if there is an
implied endorsement of religion. Although the existence of a captive
audience might require greater vigilance in examining endorsement
concerns, the focus is not the voluntary or involuntary nature of the
audience but the perceptions those in the audience might reasonably
have." As often noted, the neutral treatment of religion dissipates
endorsement concerns.26° More specifically, whatever the status of the
audience, it is hard to assume government endorsement when the speech is
the result of autonomous student choice.2
61
Third, the Court has made clear that the coercion necessary for
establishment violations is government coercion, which it has equated with
government promotion at some level. Although a captive audience might
feel pressure to participate in a prayer due to peer pressure, this pressure is
certainly far less substantial than when the government itself is promoting
the practice. Moreover, even peer pressure is substantially lessened when
the prayer is the result of autonomous student choice rather than govern-
ment or majoritarian student vote. Though sensitivity to the problem of
coercion must certainly be heightened in a captive audience setting, it does
not itself constitute the type of coercion necessary to violate the Establish-
ment Clause.
"z9 See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,777
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing in favor of the application of the
endorsement test); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 73-74 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (same).
mo See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 782 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Bd. of Educ. of
Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,248 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion).261 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 630 n.8 (Souter, J., concurring).
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For all of these reasons, the existence of a captive audience should not
be viewed as negating the fundamental distinction between prohibited state-
sponsored prayer and permitted student-initiated prayer. Both free speech
values and Establishment Clause values support the distinction even with
regard to captive audiences, and the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence
indicates that captive audience concerns are not by themselves enough to
trigger an Establishment Clause violation. The existence of a captive
audience should certainly heighten sensitivities, however, and it calls for
increased vigilance in monitoring the correct boundary between prohibited
and non-prohibited prayer. Yet the focus should continue to be whether the
prayer is state-promoted, and therefore prohibited, or the result of
autonomous student choice within an acceptable range of options, and
therefore permitted.
IV. WHAT CAN AND CANNOT BE DONE:
REMAINING PRAYER SCENARIOS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The previous section suggested that the distinction between state-
sponsored prayer and student-sponsored prayer should be the primary
starting point for analyzing school prayer cases. Thus, if the state itself is
promoting prayer, no matter how minimally, the activity should be viewed
as violating the Establishment Clause. Conversely, if the prayer in question
is the result of autonomous student choice within a broader forum of
options, the prayer should be permissible. This section will examine what
this theory permits in terms of prayer scenarios in public schools, focusing
on three continuing areas of controversy: (1) student religious clubs; (2)
moment of silence statutes; and (3) student prayers at graduation.
A. The Student Club: Mergens and Equal Access
As discussed in Part I.C, the Supreme Court in Board of Education of
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens held that student religious groups
have a right to meet for prayer and other activities on terms equal to other
student groups. Not only does such neutral treatment of religious speech
not violate the Establishment Clause, but the Court strongly suggested that
it was required by free speech principles.262 Thus, the right of student
groups to meet as part of a broader forum of student groups seems quite
secure.
262 See supra text accompanying notes 63-92.
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There are, however, two general questions remaining about the scope
of Mergens and student religious groups. The first question is whether
avoidance of an Establishment Clause violation is predicated upon a
relatively broad forum of student groups and, if so, at what point a more
limited array would trigger Establishment Clause concerns. As noted in
Part I, the Court in Mergens was divided over the Establishment Clause
issue, with no opinion receiving a majority. Although Justice Kennedy's
concurring opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, emphasized the lack of state
coercion,2 63 the plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor focused on endorse-
ment. In doing so, she gave three reasons why an "objective observer"
would not interpret recognition of the religious club as state endorsement:
first, secondary students are mature enough to understand that permitting
speech on a nondiscriminatory basis is not endorsement; second, school
officials did not participate in the meeting; and third, the broad spectrum
of officially recognized clubs counteracted any possible perception of
endorsement.2 This third factor, in which possible Establishment Clause
concerns are negated by reference to the breadth and variety of the forum
in which the religious club meets, has been noted by the Court in several
other cases, including Widmar265 and Rosenberger.2'
It might be argued, therefore, that the Mergens-type religious club is
constitutionally permissible only when it is part of a relatively broad and
diverse set of clubs, and that endorsement concerns might preclude a group
meeting when it is one of only a few clubs. Although the breadth of the
forum was noted in these cases, there are several reasons to believe that
student religious clubs should be permitted even when the number of clubs
is quite limited. First, the breadth of the forum as a factor is only relevant
under some versions of the endorsement test, and it is unclear what role that
test should currently play in Establishment Clause analysis. As noted
earlier, although endorsement concerns are frequently voiced, it is uncertain
whether endorsement has been clearly established as an independent test.267
Moreover, as argued above, endorsement concerns should be most relevant
when the state affirmatively promotes religious activity, rather than when
it merely accommodates it in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
Second, and more importantly, even under an endorsement standard,
forum breadth is only a factor, and not the crucial one at that. The critical
263 See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 260-61 (Kennedy, J., concurring).264 See id at 250-52 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
265 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981).
See Rosenberger v. Rector ofthe Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819,840-43 (1995).
27 See supra notes 118-20, 163 and accompanying text.
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concern is whether students will perceive club recognition as endorsement
Indeed, the first point emphasized by the Mergens plurality is that "[w]e
think that secondary school students are mature enough and are likely to
understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it
merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis."2' This correctly suggests
that if club recognition is truly done in a nondiscriminatory manner, and so
communicated, then endorsement should not be a concern, no matter how
broad or narrow the resulting set of clubs. Although there might be a
greater need for explicit disclaimers when the range of clubs is narrow,
recognizing clubs on a nondiscriminatory basis is more important than the
number of student groups that respond.
The second general issue remaining underMergens is whetherthe same
analysis should apply to voluntary student religious clubs in elementary, as
opposed to secondary, schools. 269 In one sense, of course, the primary
analysis should be the same at the elementary level as at the secondary
level: Is the club the result of student initiation within a policy permitting
extracurricular student groups on a nondiscriminatory basis? There are,
however, several significant differences between secondary and elementary
school students. First, elementary students are less mature and more
impressionable than secondary students and therefore are more likely to
misinterpret school recognition of clubs.270 Second, clubs themselves are
more likely to need greater adult participation to function and will rarely be
initiated by students themselves.7
Moreover, it is not insignificant that the Equal Access Act, the federal
statute applied in Mergens which prohibited discrimination among student
268 Merges, 496 U.S. at 250 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
'
9 See generally James E.M. Craig, Comment "In God We Trust" Unless We
Are a Public Elementary School. Making a Case for Extending Equal Access to
Elementary Education, 36 IDAHo L. REv. 529 (2000) (discussing types of clubs
that might form in the elementary schools and the level of protection appropriate
in that context).270 See Quappe v. Endry, 772 F. Supp. 1004, 1010-12 (S.D. Ohio 1991), af'd,
979 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing more impressionable nature of
elementary school students).
271 Most of the reported case law concerning religious clubs at elementary
schools have involved adult leadership of the clubs. See, e.g., Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000), rev'd and remanded, 121 S. Ct.
2093 (2001) (adult leadership of group); Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch.
Dist., 28 F.3d 1501, 1502 (8th Cir. 1994) (parent volunteers ran club meetings);
Quappe, 772 F. Supp. at 1006 (adult leadership of group).
[VOL. 90
PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
groups on the basis of content, applies only to secondary schools 2 This
does not necessarily mean that permitting student-initiated groups in
elementary schools violates the Establishment Clause, but it does indicate
Congress's own judgment that the need was greatest atthe secondary level.
Indeed, several of the Act's findings in terms of the maturity of students
were specifically tied to the maturity of secondary students.2"
For obvious reasons, therefore, creation of any student religious group
in elementary schools, even in the context of a limited forum of other such
groups, must be closely scrutinized. In particular, courts must ensure that
the impetus for the groups does not come from school officials, or that such
officials do not actively participate in the group. Even a truly student-
initiated group in the context of a limited forum of student clubs raises
concerns about perceived state sponsorship of the club under Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test. The more impressionable nature of such
younger students increases the possibility that they would misinterpret a
school permitting a club to meet on a nondiscriminatory basis as endorse-
ment 4
Notwithstanding these concerns, such clubs should be able to meet
even at the elementary school level if truly student-initiated, in response to
a forum of extracurricular clubs, and without significant school official
involvement. Although the likelihood of all of these conditions being met
at the elementary level is not great, if the conditions are met the club would
appear to qualify as a voluntary student choice, rather than a government-
sponsored, organization. The problems of perceived sponsorship that might
exist are best addressed through explicit disclaimers 5
272See 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (2000).
273 See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-51 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (discus-
sing legislative findings).
274 See Quappe, 772 F. Supp. at 1010-11.27s A distinct, but related, issue is the permissibility of adult-led religious clubs
in public elementary schools after school. Indeed, all of the reported cases for
elementary schools have involved such adult-led clubs, in contrast to the high
school area in which the clubs have all been student-led. The several reported cases
have involved situations where adult volunteers want to use school facilities for a
religious club, similar to other community groups that might use the facilities, such
as the Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, ornonschool athletic clubs. See Milford Cent. Sch.,
202 F.3d at 504-05; GoodNews/GoodSports Club, 28 F.3d at 1502; Quappe, 772
F. Supp. at 1004; Ford v. Manuel, 629 F. Supp. 771, 772 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
Although one of these cases involved a complete prohibition on the group meeting
(Milford Central School), the other cases involved requirements that the group
meet at a later time than other permitted groups to avoid appearances of endorse-
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B. The Moment of Silence: Remnants of Wallace
A second potential type of school prayer is when students voluntarily
use a moment of silence for the purposes of prayer. As noted in Part I,
although the Supreme Court held in Wallace v. JaffreeY6 that, under the
facts of the case, a statute which provided for a moment of meditation and
prayer violated the Establishment Clause, it did not address the validity of
a provision for just a moment of silence or meditation. A close reading of
the case, however, together with the concurring opinions, strongly suggests
that the practice of having a moment of silence or meditation should
generally be constitutional. This is true even if it is likely that some
students would use that time for silent prayer.
The statute struck down in Wallace was actually one of three related
statutes. The first statute authorized a one-minute period for silent
meditation in public school classrooms. The second statute, reviewed in
Wallace, provided for a minute period for meditation or prayer. The third
statute authorized teachers to lead willing students in a vocal prayer.
Although all three statutes were initially challenged as unconstitutional, the
petitioners, on appeal, abandoned their challenge to the first statute.
Moreover, the unconstitutionality of the third statute had been earlier
affirmed by the Supreme Court, leaving only the validity of the second
statute before the Court.2'
ment. In both situations, the religious groups argued that the distinct treatment was
discriminatory and therefore violated their free speech rights.
Lower courts addressing the issue have typically analyzedthe restrictions under
the Court's limited public forum doctrine and have split on whether differential
treatment of religious clubs is constitutional. In Good News/Good Sports Club, for
example, the Eighth Circuitheld that the different treatment of religious speech was
unconstitutional, stating that it constituted viewpoint discrimination. See Good
News/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d at 1505-07. Conversely, the Second Circuit
recently held in Milford Central School that a complete prohibition on adult-led
religious clubs from meeting after hours at public elementary schools was
constitutional. It said that the content of the speech was outside the limited genre
of the created forum and that the school was reasonable in its purpose of not
wanting to suggest endorsement of any particular religion. See Milford Cent. Sch.,
202 F.3d at 509-11. However, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's
holding in Milford Central School on the grounds that the complete ban was
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. GoodNews Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.,
121 S. Ct. 2093 (2001). The response of the lower courts remains to be seen, but
perhaps the Court's ruling in Milford Central School will settle this issue.2
'
6 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
277See id. at 40-42.
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Thus, the Court was not called upon to address the validity of a pure
moment of silence provision, but in the course of its discussion the majority
opinion appeared supportive of its validity. This particularly was seen when
the Court used the existence of the earlier statute as additional evidence
that the second statute was designed solely to promote prayer. The Court
stated:
The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of
course, quite different from merely protecting every student's right to
engage in voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence
during the schoolday. The 1978 statute already protected that right,
containing nothing that prevented any student from engaging in voluntary
prayer during a silent minute of meditation.278
This language does not explicitly affinn the constitutionality of that prior
moment of silence provision, but it certainly is supportive of it. Moreover,
the Court saw prayer as an activity that might naturally occur during a
moment of silence, even acknowledging how a moment of silence provision
could be used to protect "every student's right to engage in voluntary
prayer."279
More importantly, two concurring opinions in Wallace expressly stated
that a moment of silence provision could be constitutional. These opinions,
taken together with the dissenting justices, clearly create a majority of the
Court. Most significant was a concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor
which discussed, at length, moment of silence statutes, stating that they
should be constitutional if done correctly. In suggesting their general
validity, O'Connor emphasized that moment of silence statutes are distinct
from the school prayer struck down in earlier decisions in two important
ways. First, a moment of silence, unlike prayer, is not inherently religious.
Second, during a moment of silence students are free to participate in any
way they like and are not forced to listen to others.28° O'Connor said that
a moment of silence provision would violate the Establishment Clause,
however, if it were used to endorse or promote prayer, such as an explicit
statement on the face of the statute or an exhortation by a teacher to use the
time to pray.28'
Justice Powell's concurrence, though written for a different purpose,
expressly stated that he agreed with Justice O'Connor "that some moment-
278 Id. at 59.
2 79 Id
28See id. at 72-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
z' See id. at 73-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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of-silence statutes may be constitutional," and he even interpreted the
majority opinion as saying the same.282 Since the three dissenting justices
would have found the statute in question constitutional, even though it
seemed to promote prayer, it seems certain that they would find a pure
moment of silence provision constitutional.283 Thus, a clear majority of the
Court in Wallace were on record supporting the general constitutionality of
moment of silence provisions, with the remaining justices also apparently
supportive of such provisions. Taken as a whole, therefore, Wallace
strongly supports the validity of moment of silence provisions.
Such aposition makes substantial sense. As noted by Justice O'Connor,
moment of silence statutes do not pose the problems found with regard to
vocal prayers.2 " The state's only involvement is in providing the moment
of silence itself, which is not an inherently religious activity. To the extent
prayer occurs, whether to pray and the content of such prayer is the choice
of the students involved. Moreover, coercion is nonexistent since no one
will know how a student uses the time, making endorsement concerns
minimal. Thus, any prayer that might occur would fall on the side of
student-initiated, rather than state-sponsored, activity.
Moment of silence or meditation statutes should therefore be generally
constitutional. Establishment Clause problems arise, however, where the
state uses such provisions to actively encourage or promote prayer, such as
through official school encouragement to use the time to pray. Although in
such a situation coercion concerns would still be minimal, since students
could use the time as they choose, the prayer becomes state-initiated rather
than student-initiated. Justice O'Connor is correct, therefore, that, in
evaluating the validity of moment of silence provisions, "[t]he crucial
question is whether the State has conveyed or attempted to convey the
message that children should use the moment of silence for prayer. '285
At the time Wallace was decided, about half of the states had moment
of silence provisions,2 86 a number of which had been challenged in lower
courts. Although some were upheld as constitutional, 87 a majority of the
decisions prior to Wallace held those provisions to be unconstitutional,
2 See id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring).
283 See id. at 84-90 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 90-91 (White, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
SSee id at 72-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
's Id. at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).286 See id at 70-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that twenty-five states
had statutes providing for a moment of silence in classrooms).
1 7 See, e.g., Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337 (D. Mass. 1976).
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relying primarily on the Engel and Schempp decisions.288 As shown above,
that reasoning would appear to be incorrect, and, after Wallace, such
provisions should be valid if properly drawn.
Today, at least twenty states continue to have statutes providing for a
moment of silence during the school day.2" 9 These statutes fall into two
basic types. First, about half of the statutes provide for a moment of silence
for meditation or other purposes, without any explicit identification of
prayer as a possible use of the time.290 The other half of the statutes
mention prayer as one of several possible uses of the time, typically stating
that the time can be used for "silent prayer or meditation"29 ' or "meditation,
prayer or reflection."'292
It would appear that those statutes providing for a moment of silence
without reference to prayer are clearly constitutional under Wallace, even
if students choose to use the time for prayer. As noted above, a moment of
silence is not inherently religious and would neither coerce nor endorse
religion.
2
'"See, e.g., May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N.J. 1983); Duffy v. Las
Cruces Pub. Schs., 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1983); Beck v. McElrath, 548 F.
Supp. 1161 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
289SeeALA. CODE §§ 16-1-20,16-1-20.3 (1995); CONN. GEN. STAT.ANN. § 10-
16a (West 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4101A (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
233.062 (West 1998); GA. CODEANN. § 20-2-1050 (2001); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 20/1 (West 1998); IND. CODE § 20-10.1-7-11 (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-
5308a (1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §17:2115(A) (West 2001); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20-A, § 4805(2) (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-104 (1999);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, §§ IA, lB (West 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 380.1565 (West 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. 388.075 (2000); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§1 8A:36-4 (West 1999); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3029-a (McKinney 2001); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3313.601 (Anderson 1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516.1
(West 1992); RI. GEN. LAWS § 16-12-3.1 (1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1004
(1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-203 (Lexis 2000).
290 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4101A (1999) (brief period, not to
exceed two minutes, to be used according to dictates of individual student's
conscience); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (2001) (brief period of reflection);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1565 (West 2001) (opportunity for silent
meditation); RI. GEN. LAWS § 16-1-12-3.1 (1996) (minute of silence for
meditation).
29! See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 233.062 (West 1998); IND. CODE § 20-10.1-7-11
(1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2115(A) (West 2001).292 See NEV. REV. STAT. 388.075 (2001); see also W. VA. CONsT. art. III, §
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Indeed, the only post-Wallace case to address a moment of silence
statute, Bown v. Gwinnett County School District,293 held it to be constitu-
tional. There the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a Georgia statute which
allowed teachers to "conduct a brief period of quiet reflection for not more
than 60 seconds" at the start of the school day. 94 In finding the statute
valid, the court applied the Lemon test, finding that the statute had a secular
purpose, did not advance religion, and did not involve an excessive
entanglement with religion.295 It distinguished Wallace by noting that the
record in the case indicated that the statute served a secular purpose,
whereas in Wallace the statute was singularly designed to promote
prayer.29 The court also noted that there was no coercion of any kind, as
in Lee, and that the moment of quiet reflection could be used in any manner
a student chose, whether it be to pray or not to pray.297
It is less clear whether those statutes which expressly mention prayer
as one possible use of the moment of silence are constitutional. It might be
argued that the reference to prayer is designed to promote its use, which
would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Moreover, the statute struck
down by the Court in Wallace was of this type, providing a minute of
silence in public elementary and secondary schools for the purpose of
"meditation or voluntary prayer."'29 Similarly, in upholding the moment of
silence statute in Bown, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the term "period of
quiet reflection" had been substituted for earlier statutory language that
stated "prayer or meditation," which the court stated strengthened the
statute's secular purpose."M
Nonetheless, inc tusion of prayer as one of several possible uses of the
time is not necessarily invalid under Wallace. Despite the similarity in
language, the Supreme Court struck down the statute in Wallace because
of what it considered the clear statutory purpose to promote prayer, which
it felt was reflected in two respects. First, the legislative history in Wallace
indicated that the sole purpose of the moment of silence statute in that case
was to promote prayer, a motive the bill's sponsor unashamedly and clearly
acknowledged." Second, since a previous statute already provided for a
2"3 Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 1464 (1lth Cir. 1997).
294 GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-1050 (2001).
29- See Bown, 112 F.3d at 1468-74.
296 See id. at 1471-72.
297 See id. at 1473.
298 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 40 (1985) (quoting ALA. CODE § 16-1-
20.1).299 Bown, 112 F.3d at 1469 n.3.
"0 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56-57.
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moment of silent meditation, the challenged statute served no purpose but
to add prayer as a suggested activity.3°' In this context, the Court held that
it failed the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test. 2
It is therefore uncertain whether a statute which provides a period of
silence "for mediation or prayer," but which lacks the clear legislative
history of Wallace and which does not have a separate statute for medita-
tion would be invalid. Although the reference to prayer might still be
somewhat troubling, the reference could be defended as simply recognizing
that prayer was one of several permissible uses of the period of silence.
This point was explicitly made by Justice O'Connor in her Wallace
concurrence, where she stated "[e]ven if a statute specifies that a student
may choose to pray silently during a quiet moment, the State has not
thereby encouraged prayer over other specified alternatives." 3 It would
thus appear that statutory references to prayer do not necessarily make a
statute invalid.
What is more important than how a statute reads is what is actually said
to students in the classroom. As noted above, "[t]he crucial question is
whether the State has conveyed or attempted to convey the message that
children should use the moment of silence for prayer."' '3 ° Thus, as stated by
Justice O'Connor, "if [a] teacher exhorts children to use the designated
time to pray," this would involve active promotion of prayer and would be
unconstitutional. 3 5 Even a mild suggestion that children pray would be
invalid since it would still involve promotion of prayer. On the other hand,
including prayer as one of several possible uses of the time, with no
suggestion that children should pray, would appear to be constitutional. The
best course of action, of course, would be simply to tell the students there
will be a moment of silence, and the students are free to use the time in any
way they choose.
C. Graduation Prayers and Student Speakers
The Supreme Court's decision in Lee v. Weisman" greatly limited
inclusion of prayers in public school graduation ceremonies. As a practical
matter, it shut the door on the state itself sponsoring or directing the prayer,
30 See id. at 59-61.
3
"
2 Id at 56.
303 Id. at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
304 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).305 Id (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'06 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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even if delivered by someone other than a school official 7 The decision
did not, however, necessarily prohibit all graduation prayers?"3 As noted
earlier, the decision was based on two dominant concerns, the first being
the state's own pervasive involvement in the prayer."° This strongly
suggested that truly student-initiated, rather than state-initiated, prayers
might be constitutional, a position consistent with the general voluntary
student versus state-sponsored approach to resolving school prayer issues.
The Court's decision in Santa Fe did not necessarily upset the basic
distinction drawn inLee, but it clarified its meaning bybeing more specific.
As noted earlier, the voting scheme reviewed in Santa Fe-which allowed
a majoritarian vote by the students to decide whether to pray and who was
to pray-was essentially a response to the Court's emphasis on the
pervasive state involvement with the prayer in Lee. Although putting those
issues to a student vote arguably lessened to some degree the state's
involvement, the Court in Santa Fe correctly stated that the voting scheme
nevertheless still constituted state promotion of prayer. In particular, the
Court suggested that by even presenting the question, the state was
promoting prayer.10 Furthermore, the Court noted that deciding the issue
by majority vote presented special difficulties to religious minorities.3 '
Thus, SantaFe, though preserving the general distinction between student-
initiated and state-sponsored prayer, indicated that even more subtle forms
of state promotion of prayer would be unconstitutional.
An initial question presented by Santa Fe is whether a similar voting
scheme for prayer at graduation exercises would also be unconstitutional. 2
'
07 See id at 587-88.
"' For recent articles discussing graduation prayers after Lee, see Charles J.
Russo, Prayer at Public School Graduation Ceremonies: An Exercise in Futility
or a Teachable Moment?, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1; Delaney, supra note 254, at
1783; Ann E. Stockman, Comment, ACLU v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of
Education: The Black Sheep of Graduation Prayer Cases, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1805
(1999).
o9 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 586-88.
310 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305, 314-15 (2000).
31 See id at 305-06.
312 Prior to Santa Fe, four federal circuits had reviewed voting schemes for
graduation prayer, with the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits holding such schemes
constitutional and the Third and Ninth Circuits holding such schemes unconstitu-
tional. The Fifth Circuit heldthat the scheme was constitutional because, by putting
the decision whether to pray and who was to pray into the hands of students, the
district policy avoided the substantial state involvement emphasized in Lee. See
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 970-71 (5th Cir. 1992).
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held constitutional a school policy which had
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Even though the school district policy in that case involved essentially
similar voting arrangements for both prayer at graduation and prayer at
sporting events, in accepting the case for review the Court expressly limited
the question to that of the constitutionality of student-led prayer at football
games' 13 In doing so, the Court arguably left open the possible validity of
a similar scheme for graduation. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit itself, from where
the case arose, had essentially drawn that very distinction. In Jones v. Clear
CreekIndependent SchoolDistrict,1 4 the Fifth Circuit upheld such a voting
arrangement for prayer at graduation, but it struck down identical voting
schemes for student prayer at sporting events in two subsequent cases. 315 In
doing so, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the distinction between graduation
ceremonies, where the unique and solemn nature of the occasion might
make a student-initiated and student-led prayer appropriate, and sporting
events, where prayer should play no role 6
Despite the limited nature of the question reviewed in the Supreme
Court's Santa Fe decision and the distinction drawn in the Fifth Circuit, it
is hard to see how the Supreme Court's analysis in Santa Fe is not equally
applicable to prayer at graduation ceremonies. Although graduation is
typically a more unique and solemn occasion than football games, this
students vote on whether to have brief opening and closing messages and who
should deliverthem, emphasizing the lack of state involvement. See Adler v. Duval
County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070, 1073-74 (1 lth Cir.), vacated and remanded by
531 U.S. 801 (2000).
In contrast, the Third Circuit rejected the previous Fifth Circuit position and
found the voting scheme unconstitutional. See ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike
Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996). It acknowledged that the state
involvement was certainly less than in Lee but said that the prayer still had the
imprint of the state in a number of ways, including the fact that it was a school-
sponsored event on school property over which school officials retained tight
control. See id. at 1479. Moreover, students would decide the prayer issue only
because the school let them decide it, further indicating the state's involvement. Id
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit also rejected Jones, stating that delegating to students
the decision whether to pray was still unconstitutional. See Harris v. Joint Sch.
Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447,454-55 (9th Cir. 1994).
31 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301.
314 Jones, 977 F.2d at 963.
315 See Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 1999), aff'd,
530 U.S. 290 (2000); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 406-07
(5th Cir. 1995).
316 See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 823 ("The controlling feature here is the same as
in Duncanville: The prayers are to be delivered atfootballgames-hardly the sober
type of annual event that can be appropriately solemnized with prayer.").
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consideration is not particularly relevant to the central distinction drawn in
both Lee and Santa Fe between state-sponsored prayer and voluntary
student prayer. For the same reasons that the voting scheme concerning
football games contained substantial state involvement, despite the
supposed "circuit-breaker" of a student vote,"7 so, too, would a similar
arrangement for student-led prayer at graduation contain substantial state
involvement. In particular, the very fact that the school district is isolating
the issue of prayer for a vote itself suggests promotion of the idea.
Moreover, the vote will assure a majoritarian perspective and thus lack the
range of options that a truly voluntary scheme would include.
That its analysis in SantaFe should also apply to graduation prayer was
strongly suggested by the Supreme Court itself when it recently summarily
vacated the Eleventh Circuit decision in Adler v. Duval County School
Board and remanded the case for reconsideration in light ofSanta Fe.3 8 In
Adler, the Eleventh Circuit had held that a school board policy which
permitted students to vote on whether to have a "brief opening and/or
closing message, not to exceed two minutes," at graduation and, if so,
which student was to deliver it, was constitutional.1 9 In finding the policy
constitutional, the Eleventh Circuit stressed that not only was the decision
to deliver a message made by students rather than the state, but that the
content of the message was decided neither by the state nor by student
plebiscite, but by an autonomous student speaker.3 0 As such, it avoided the
primary concerns found in Lee.
The Supreme Court's summary vacation of this decision and remand
in light of Santa Fe does not necessarily mean that the policy in Adler is
unconstitutional32' since several significant differences exist between that
policy and the one struck down in Santa Fe. In particular, the Adler policy
did not involve a vote on prayer, as such, but only whether to have a
message.3' At a minimum, however, the Supreme Court's action strongly
suggests that the analysis developed in Santa Fe regarding student votes on
prayer is applicable to the graduation context. Thus, where a school policy
provides for a student vote on prayer at graduation, that policy should be
317 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305.
3See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 531 U.S. 801 (2000).
319 See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070, 1072-74 (1 1th Cir.),
vacated and remanded by 531 U.S. 801 (2000).320 See id at 1074-76.
32 Upon reconsideration in light of Santa Fe, the Eleventh Circuit reinstated its
initial opinion. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330 (1 1th Cir. 2001).322 But see infra notes 340-45 and accompanying text.
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unconstitutional for essentially the same reasons as articulated in Santa
Fe.323
Indeed, it is fair to say after Santa Fe and Lee that any affirmative state
action to promote graduation prayers, whether by student vote or otherwise,
would be unconstitutional. The most obvious example would be where a
school district policy provides for an invocation or other form of prayer at
graduation, even if delivered by a student. As recently suggested by the
Ninth Circuit in Cole v. Oroville Union High School District,324 any school
policy specifically providing for prayer of any type would be unconstitu-
tional under Santa Fe.3
Thus, to the extent that graduation prayers remain permissible afterLee
and Santa Fe, they should be truly student-initiated. Although this
significantly, and appropriately, limits the possibility of prayer, such prayer
might occur under a narrow policy in which prayer is one of several options
for a student. For example, in Doe v. Madison School District,26 decided
shortly before Santa Fe, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a school district policy
that permitted a minimum of four students, selected on the basis of
academic class standing, to speak at graduation. Students themselves
decided the content of what to say, which the policy stated may be "an
address, poem, reading, song, musical presentation, prayer, or any other
pronouncement."327 School officials were prohibited from censoring the
content of the presentation; they were permitted to advise students on "the
appropriate language for the audience and occasion," but the students were
free to reject the advice.328
The Ninth Circuit held the policy to be constitutional, rejecting the
argument that Lee established a per se rule against prayer at graduation.
The court noted that Lee emphasized that it was confined by two facts: the
substantial state involvement in the prayer and its coercive effect upon
students. Although pressure to attend graduation might exist, the school
323 See Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH.
LAW. 25, 56-57 (2000) (arguing that Santa Fe appears to prohibit election of
student prayer leaders at graduations and other activities).
324 Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).
32S See id at 1102 ("[A]s the Court noted in Santa Fe, an invocation policy by
its very terms appears to reflect an impermissible state purpose to encourage a
religious message.").
3 Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated




district policy lacked the substantial state involvement present in Lee.329 In
particular, the court noted that students themselves delivered the presenta-
tions, selection of the speakers was on a neutral basis, and---most
importantly-the content of the presentation was the autonomous choice
of the student speaker, with prayer being just one of many possibilities. As
such, control was vested in students and was not in any meaningful way
directed by the state.3
The decision in Doe was subsequently vacated on grounds that the
parties challenging the policy lacked standing.331 Although the earlier
decision is thereby deprived of its precedential value, the court's reasoning
in that decision would still appear to be correct and the type of policy
reviewed there constitutional even after Santa Fe. It might be argued,
however, that even where the state itself is in no significant way involved
with the prayer, it is still unconstitutional under an endorsement test if it is
done in a state-controlled, nonvoluntary ceremony. Although the Court in
Santa Fe primarily emphasized the state's involvement in promoting the
prayer, it also noted the contextual dimensions of the pregame prayer: it
was on school property, it was over the school public address system, and
it was said in an environment surrounded by banners and uniforms bearing
the school's name.332 Similar contextual factors likely also would exist even
for graduation prayers of the type that might occur under the policy
approved in Doe. Arguably, the totality of the contextual factors, in which
attendees might understand the prayer to be promoted by the state, together
with its potentially coercive impact on some students, suggest that even
such truly voluntary student prayer should be invalid.333 Indeed, several
lower courts have noted such contextual concerns in finding graduation
prayers unconstitutional, both before and after Santa Fe, though none rest
on that basis alone."u
329 See id. at 834-35.
330 See id at 835.
31 See Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (en
bane).332 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 307-08 (2000).
333 For such an argument, made prior to the Santa Fe decision, see Delaney,
supra note 254, at 1825-28. But see Stockman, supra note 308, at 1829-37
(rejecting such an argument).334 See Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000);
ACLU ofN.J. v. BlackHorse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471,1479 (3d Cir.
1996). Neither Cole nor Black Horse found a constitutional violation on these
factors alone but noted them along with other concerns more directly relating to the
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Such an argument, in effect, amounts to a rejection of any prayer at
graduations and should be rejected for several reasons. First, although an
endorsement standard might well be used in such a manner, it hardly need
be, nor does Santa Fe as a whole suggest that it should be. The primary
focus in Santa Fe was the state's affirmative promotion of prayer, and the
contextual concerns were given in that context. Indeed, both Lee and Santa
Fe made substantial government involvement a primary focus of their
holdings 35
Further support for permitting limited prayer of the type approved in
Doe is found in Lee and Santa Fe themselves. Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion in Lee completely ignored an endorsement analysis, the rejection
of which he more explicitly presented in his Mergens concurrence.33 6
Although the remaining members of the Lee majority voiced their
continued support of endorsement through concurring opinions, three of
thosejustices, in a concurring opinion by Justice Souter, seemed to approve
the type of voluntary student prayer in Doe, stating that "[i]f the State had
chosen its graduation day speakers according to wholly secular criteria, and
if one of those speakers (not a state actor) had individually chosen to
deliver a religious message, it would have been harder to attribute an
endorsement of religion to the State."3"
Support for the Doe type of prayer can also be found in the Santa Fe
majority's analysis of the public forum issue. There the Court noted that it
had previously permitted religious speech on school property and even
through a school structure where it was part of a limited public forum
created by the state. The pregame prayer decided by a student vote failed
to qualify as such a public forum, however, because it was limited to only
one view, voted on by the majority, rather than the full range of opinion
typically permitted by a public forum.338 Importantly, however, the Court
noted that even a single speaker might qualify as a public forum, thereby
dissipating Establishment Clause concerns, if the messages that might be
communicated are not limited by the state?39 Thus, the Court suggested that
it was the range of options, rather than the number of participants, that was
school's promotion of the prayer.
33 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 305-06; Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-88
(1992).
336 See Bd. ofEduc. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,260-61
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
117 Lee, 505 U.S. at 630 n.8 (Souter, J., concurring).331 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 303.
339 See id at 304.
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critical, and the problem in Santa Fe was that only a majoritarian message
would be voiced. In contrast, the type of policy approved in Doe permits a
speaker to say virtually anything and is clearly not tied to a majoritarian
position.
Finally, the policy that was upheld by the Eleventh Circuit in Adler v.
Duval County School Board' (and subsequently summarily vacated and
remanded by the Supreme Court for consideration in light of Santa Fe) is
somewhat more problematic. That policy provided that the graduating class
could vote on whether to have a brief (not to exceed two minutes) opening
and/or closing message at high school graduations and, if so, could vote on
the student speaker. The policy also provided that the content of the
message would be prepared by the selected student and could not be
monitored or even reviewed by school officials. 41 On that basis, the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the policy, particularly emphasizing that the
content of the message was decided by neither the school nor student
plebiscite but by the individual student chosen to speak.342
On the one hand, this policy avoids several of the more problematic
aspects of Santa Fe. First, by making the vote on whether to have opening
and/or closing messages, rather than on prayer, the school was not singling
out prayer for special treatment. This is arguably in contrast to Santa Fe,
where the Court emphasized that the very act of putting the prayer issue to
a vote was a form of endorsement. 43 Second, as emphasized by the
Eleventh Circuit, the decision to deliver a religious message is one made by
an individual student among a range of options, rather than by the state as
in Lee or by a student vote as in Santa Fe. In this sense, it is arguably
similar to the type of religious message approved in Justice Souter's
concurring opinion in Lee.
Despite this analysis, the policy in Adler still poses several significant
Establishment Clause problems and should probably be found unconstitu-
tional. First, despite structuring the vote to be on opening and closing
messages rather than prayer, the policy might be seen simply as a subtle
way of seeking a plebiscite on prayer. Indeed, by voting on short messages
at the beginning or the end of the ceremony, the policy seems to suggest
invocations and benedictions, which are short prayers to open and close
"o Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir.), vacated and
remanded by 531 U.S. 801 (2000).
341 See id at 1072.342 See id at 1076.343 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 306.
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events. To the extent that a policy such as this can be shown to be a
deliberate attempt to encourage prayer, rather than an honest effort to
permit an individual student to select an opening or closing message from
a range of options, the policy is invalid.?"
Second, the voting scheme itself might fail to meet the selection by
secular criteriarequirement suggested by Justice Souter. UnlikeDoe, where
the student speaker was selected by class rank, here the speaker is selected
by student vote. On its face this is secular since the vote itself is not about
prayer or the content of the message but only who will speak. As a practical
matter, however, the vote on a student to deliver the message might well be
based on the perceived content of that person's message, either because the
student advertised in advance what he or she would say or because of the
general reputation of the student. More specifically, the possibility exists
that a student might be selected because he or she made clear in advance
that a prayer would be said or because students perceived that the person
would use the time to pray. In this sense, the scheme begins to look quite
similar to that struck down in Santa Fe, posing the same concerns about
imposition of majoritarian religious views. 5
For this reason in particular, the policy in Adler, though somewhat
removed from the problems presented in Santa Fe, should still be unconsti-
tutional. A slightly modified policy in which student speakers are selected
on some criteria other than a vote, such as class rank, should probably be
valid. In such an instance, any decision to pray or otherwise include a
religious theme would be the autonomous decision of the student, within
a completely wide-open range of options, devoid of control or supervision
by the state. As such, it represents the type of student-initiated speech
arguably anticipated by both Lee and Santa Fe. More fundamentally, it
avoids state promotion of prayer, which is clearly prohibited, and repre-
sents the type of student speech protected under the Free Speech Clause.
In sum, most efforts at graduation prayers should be unconstitutional
under the standards in Lee and Santa Fe. In particular, any attempt by
schools themselves to promote prayer at graduation exercises, even if
students deliver the prayers, should be unconstitutional. Most obvious
would be where school policy includes prayer in the graduation exercises.
" The Court in Santa Fe made clear in several different places that it would not
"turn a blind eye to the context in which [a] policy arose." Rather, it would
examine the circumstances in which a policy is enacted. Id at 315.
.
4 See id at 303-05 (discussing constitutional problems with imposing majori-
tarian religious views by student election).
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Even an attempt to shift the decision to students by permitting them to vote
on prayer is unconstitutional since it still involves affirmative state
promotion of prayer and presents the further danger of majoritarian
decisions. Prayer should be allowed, however, in the very limited situation
where a student, selected by secular criteria, chooses prayer within an
acceptable range of options, without encouragement or control by the state.
Not only are Establishment Clause concerns minimized in such a situation,
but free speech concerns strongly suggest protecting the student's
autonomous choice in such a situation.
CONCLUSION
Government-sponsored prayer is abad idea, and government-promoted
prayer involving elementary and secondary students is particularly
disturbing. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court has
consistently held any government attempt to sponsor prayer to be unconsti-
tutional, even when minimal in nature. In doing so, however, the Court has
been careful to affirm and even protect students' own rights to engage in
voluntary prayer at school. This basic distinction was affirmed in the
Court's most recent prayer case, Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe, in which the Court held unconstitutional a school policy permitting
students to vote on prayer at football games.346 Though clearly reflecting
the Court's continuing resolve to ensure that the state does not promote
prayer in school, even in more subtle and attenuated forms, the Court
repeatedly affirmed students' own right to engage in voluntary prayer at
school.
This basic distinction between government-sponsored prayer and
voluntary student prayer best reflects the competing constitutional values
potentially at stake when examining prayer in public schools. When
students truly initiate prayer themselves as one of several speech options,
Establishment Clause concerns, which focus on government's role in
promoting religion, are minimized, while free speech concerns are
heightened. In particular, the same focus on neutrality which suggests
student prayer should be permitted under free speech principles, also
addresses and dissipates Establishment Clause concerns. Conversely, when
government promotes the prayer, Establishment Clause concerns are
heightened while free speech concerns are generally not present.
As a practical matter, this distinction between government and student
prayer permits rather limited prayer scenarios in public schools after Santa
Fe. Most notable are the continuing viability of student religious clubs
3461d. at 317.
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affirmed in Mergens and moment of silence statutes. Both of these involve
truly voluntary, and essentially private, prayer by students that remain
viable options. On the other hand, the permissibility of prayer in more
structured settings, such as graduations, is much more limited. However,
even in a graduation, prayer might be permitted where it is the result of
truly autonomous student choice within an appropriate range of options and
without government promotion. But government efforts to promote prayer
in such settings, even by student voting, should be held unconstitutional.

